


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6 OCTOBER 1988



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Arms Control

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Czech Delegate Addresses Disarmament Conference

AU2109111088 Bratislava *PRAVDA* in Slovak
16 Sep 88 p 7

[Dispatch by special CTK reporter: "Statement by Czechoslovak Representative at the Disarmament Conference; the Expected Results Have Not Been Attained"]

[Text] Geneva—Ambassador Milos Vejvoda, head of the Czechoslovak delegation, yesterday [15 September] addressed the plenary session of the Geneva disarmament conference on behalf of the group of socialist countries and evaluated the course and results of this year's session.

He stated with regret that the expected results could not be reached in any of the priority issues of nuclear disarmament included in the conference agenda. This primarily applies to the ban on nuclear arms tests—an issue in which the socialist countries are striving to achieve agreement on a general and total test ban.

In this context, the Czechoslovak representative recalled that most delegations to the conference support Czechoslovakia's recent proposal to give a committee a mandate to discuss this issue in parallel with the bilateral USSR-U.S. negotiations.

In the next part of his speech, M. Vejvoda expressed the regret felt by the socialist countries with regard to the negligible progress achieved in preparing measures for averting an armament race in outer space. He emphasized that the socialist countries are interested in having the appropriate working committee open negotiations on specific measures which would prevent the deployment of any and all kinds of arms in outer space.

The only issue to be really discussed in a businesslike manner at the conference, an issue in which certain results have been reached, was the preparation of a convention on a general ban on, and the destruction of, chemical weapons. In this issue the working committee has succeeded in reaching an agreement on the definition of production facilities for chemical weapons, so that it became possible to incorporate the appropriate text in the draft of the future convention. Progress was also achieved in working out the principles of peaceful cooperation in the chemical industry; this, too, is an important part of the proposed accord.

Another positive element in negotiations on banning chemical weapons was the progress in the multilateral exchange of data on chemical arms and the chemical industry; the socialist countries have contributed to this progress not only by producing the corresponding data, but also by submitting proposals on the subject of this

exchange. The USSR proposal to carry out experimental inspections in chemical facilities both on a national and an international level represented a significant initiative here.

The checks on adherence to the ban on chemical arms are a complicated issue. Here, too, the socialist countries are striving to establish a strict inspection regime.

Ambassador Vejvoda concluded his statement by expressing (on behalf of the socialist countries) the conviction that, in evaluating the work accomplished by the Disarmament Conference in 1988, the 43d UN General Assembly will urge this body to step up its activities and to speed up its work in all sectors.

HUNGARY

FGR's Ruhl Discusses NATO, Warsaw Pact Doctrines

25000254y Budapest *MAGYAR HIRLAP* in Hungarian
2 Sep 88 p 2

[Interview with FGR Deputy National Defense Minister Lothar Ruhl by Katalin Karcagi: "Military Doctrines Can Be Compared on the Basis of Specifics"; date and place not given]

[Text] Yesterday and the day before this newspaper familiarized its readers with the Soviet and the American viewpoints on comparisons of conventional armaments and armaments and the opportunities for and obstacles to arms reduction. FGR Deputy National Defense Minister Lothar Ruhl took part at the Budapest international round-table discussion concerning conventional disarmament. We interviewed the West German military policymaker.

[Question] Many American and even West German politicians had reservations concerning the ratification of the agreement which calls for the destruction of medium-range missiles (INF). They stressed the point that nuclear disarmament will be necessarily followed by conventional armament, otherwise the security of Western nations would be endangered. What is your view of this issue?

[Answer] We have no means to bring about conventional armament, we do not even intend to arm ourselves with conventional armaments. At issue was—and continues to be—the improvement of our traditional defense capability. We wish to correct shortcomings in our defense structure. We do not intend to replace disarmed nuclear weapons with conventional ones, but it is our goal to bring about European stability, Europe's traditional ability to defend itself as independently as possible from constraints created by possible international crises which would prematurely require the use of nuclear weapons. Although we do not wish to fully divorce European defenses from nuclear weapons—we would not accept

such a condition even if it came about as a result of an agreement—we wish to avoid a situation in which we must fully rely on the deterrent effects of nuclear weapons.

[Question] Considering the breakthrough in the nuclear field, it becomes even more apparent that no substantial progress was made in negotiations concerning conventional weapons. How do you explain this situation? With the more complex character of the problem?

[Answer] It is simple, or rather, more simple to negotiate over a perceivable number of rockets and airplanes which may also be used as nuclear or atomic weapons. The larger these nuclear weapons, launch sites, and installations, the easier it is to detect them and to control them. Accordingly, by virtue of the subject matter, nuclear arms limitation renders itself an easier subject to negotiate than conventional weapons where the issue revolves around armored divisions, composite military organizational structures and weapons systems of varying magnitude. Ground armaments can be disguised more easily. And further, there would be a need to agree upon the basis to serve for comparison, and on the conditions for calculations. Already within the INF agreement there were a lot of problems with airplanes. Defining categories is now becoming even more complicated. For example, how do we define an attack armored vehicle, and how do we distinguish it from an armored vehicle which serves defensive purposes? Which weapons should be classified as artillery, and how should we compare these? How should we treat airplanes? Which airplane serves attack purposes, and which ones are of a defensive character? How should one view airplanes which have a dual character? Based on their equipment and the training of their crews, they could be used both for the defense of airspace as well as for attack purposes. What principles should guide us in implementing an asymmetric reduction of our armed forces? Having said all this I must say that some progress has been made in discussions between Warsaw Pact and NATO countries toward defining a mandate for disarmament negotiations. Last 14 December we agreed on the common goals of averting the danger stemming from attacks spanning large areas and surprise attacks, and achieving identical levels in terms of troop strength. These, of course, are general objectives; they are not specific starting points for negotiation, but I am certain that we will agree with respect to a mandate soon—this year.

[Question] Warsaw Pact nations proposed that the negotiation agenda include an item which calls for the discontinuation of inequalities in strength between the two groupings. Why did NATO have reservations about this offer?

[Answer] First of all I should point out that by making this offer, the Warsaw Pact responded to a longstanding proposal advanced by NATO. Our aim is to establish identical levels of armed forces, troop levels, weapons systems which govern the battlefield, battle tanks and

defense tanks and, artillery. The Warsaw Pact wants to discuss simultaneously weapons which have nuclear applications as well as fighter airplanes. We do not rule out negotiations concerning fighter airplanes, nevertheless we say that those should take place in a subsequent phase of negotiations. And further, we have certain reservations concerning this proposal because contrary to what the Warsaw Pact states, NATO does not enjoy great superiority with respect to fighter airplanes. To the contrary. Our calculations show that the Warsaw Pact has somewhat more fighter airplanes. And insofar as the inclusion of weapons systems which could be equipped to deliver nuclear charges are concerned, we are prepared to include artillery as a whole as part of the negotiations, including equipment which is also capable of launching nuclear grenades. But as I said, this should take place in the next round of negotiations. As long as we do not deal with conventional weapons—which we envision as the main threat to European stability—we should not negotiate on new nuclear weapons either. The negotiations should lead to a point where the disproportions are done away with, so that the Warsaw Pact dismantles its forces and tanks more vigorously.

[Question] Warsaw Pact member nations also recommended that the two military groupings debate over the offensive versus defensive character of the doctrines that underlie the two military groupings. Do you find any merit to this suggestion?

[Answer] We are prepared to compare doctrines, but not in the abstract. Such a comparison should be based on the structure, deployment, and capacity of military forces. In the sense that this term is used in socialist countries, NATO has no military doctrine. Using the Soviet example, East European countries defined a doctrine which has a so-called sociopolitical side as well as a military technology aspect. We do not have an aggregate [view of] socio-political, ideological, and military-philosophical principles. What we have are operative principles of deployment, and of course, a strategic conception. And further, every plan for deployment has both offensive and deterrent elements. And if we argue about which elements are offensive, and which ones are defensive—this will be like arguing about the gender of angels.

[Question] If we consider balanced security as the important factor on the European Continent, do you feel that withdrawal of foreign troops would contribute to the accomplishment of balanced security?

[Answer] We envision the reduction of troops only in terms of a percentage of the total number of troops. But we must also consider that five American divisions are stationed in the FGR for instance, while in contrast, 19 Soviet divisions are stationed in the GDR. Accordingly, we cannot say that both sides should withdraw five divisions.

[Question] And would you agree to the idea of withdrawing all troops stationed abroad?

[Answer] No, we would not. In the FGR we need the presence of the Allied forces, so we can defend our entire territory comprehensively. We would not be able to provide such defense by using West German forces only.

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Ruehe Urges 'Multiphase' Conventional Disarmament Negotiation

36200219Y Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 6 Sep 88 p 2

[Article by C.G.: "Ruehe: NATO Must Take the Offensive: CDU Politician Calls for Western Proposals on Disarmament"]

[Text] Bonn, 5 Sep—The foreign policy expert of the CDU, Ruehe, has called on NATO to begin a "realistic offensive" against the suggestions of the Soviet party chief Gorbachev with "bold proposals" on conventional disarmament. Negotiations would also take place by way of influencing public opinion; the West must not thereby leave matters to the Warsaw Pact and continually say merely that the thrusts from the East will be "examined." In the last 2 years, the West has primarily been negotiating with itself; a weakness therein is that there is still no Western proposal for negotiations with the Warsaw Pact. On Monday in Bonn, Ruehe said that it is no use merely to recite the formula that the conventional disarmament must take place asymmetrically, so that the East must disarm more because it has more weapons in this area. At a meeting in Budapest in which generals, scientists and politicians invited by a New York Institute for Security Policy Studies dealt with conventional disarmament, it became apparent that numerous difficulties are to be expected in the negotiations. It is therefore to be recommended that future East-West talks not deal with "the entire material at once" but that they proceed gradually.

Despite the desired asymmetry, a NATO proposal must also foresee sacrifices by the West so that the East cannot immediately reject it, said Ruehe. Initially the negotiations must deal with tanks, artillery and armored vehicles, because these weapon systems are suitable for an invasion. Aircraft should not be talked about until later; to be sure, one can destroy a country with aircraft but not occupy it. The notion of an invasion capability is therefore not so easily valid for aircraft. The mobility of aircraft makes the negotiations more difficult with respect to geographically limited areas.

Ruehe proposed dividing a Western concept into three stages. In a first step, agreement should be reached on identical upper limits for tanks below the current Western inventory. Ruehe characterized a reduction to 15,000 tanks on each side in the European "central region" as desirable for East and West. Accordingly, the Warsaw Pact would

have to eliminate 20,000 tanks and NATO 2,000. The "central region" takes in the area from Great Britain and Portugal to the internal German border in the West and the territory from the internal German border to the Urals in the East. In a second step, half of the remaining tanks on each side would be stored in depots monitored by the other side, so that on each side only 7,500 tanks would be assigned to the active formations. In a third step, a formula is to be found that would change the ratio between domestic forces and allied stationed forces. The systems of the stationing powers should not make up more than 50 percent of the armed forces, said Ruehe. That will result in substantial reductions of the Soviet tank forces—in the GDR, for example.

Ruehe said that his proposal presented in Budapest goes further than the concept of the Federal Government, which is now up for discussion in NATO. But it is more important that the West take the initiative than for NATO ultimately to reach agreement merely on the least common denominator. The deputy chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group said that there should be further negotiations on nuclear weapons when the "first tangible results of conventional negotiations" are achieved. The West must also define a minimum of nuclear weapons needed in the future, whereby reductions would be possible above all in the systems with the shortest ranges. But the remaining minimum would also have to be kept at an up-to-date technical level. Bonn will not be able to avoid such a modernization. The SPD [he said] is behaving "unfit for the alliance" and is losing any latitude for conventional disarmament when it wants to renounce nuclear deterrence completely.

In Hungary, Ruehe visited a village in which one-fourth of the inhabitants are German. There is a German kindergarten and religious services in German [are held] there, said Ruehe. In its treatment of national minorities, Hungary is setting an example for Poland and Romania. At the Vienna Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and in the United Nations, Ruehe proposed, Bonn's foreign policy together with Hungary should find "frank words" for "Ceausescu's bulldozer policy," with which Romania is infringing upon the established form of the country to the detriment of the German and Hungarian minorities.

After a trip of several CDU representatives of parliament, Ruehe also expressed himself on human rights in Chile. The situation has improved there: emigrants could return, death sentences have been reversed, and an election under clearly correct circumstances is slated for October. "We should concern ourselves with Chile not only when things are going badly there; we should also acknowledge good reports," said Ruehe. Whoever wants to help Chile must help the country make progress on the way to democracy; delegations from parliament and the parties should make more trips to Chile and in this way establish "protection for human rights."

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YUGOSLAVIA

Soviet Negotiator Interviewed by Yugoslav Journal
52003001 Zagreb START in Serbo-Croatian 25 Jun 88
pp 60-63

[Interview with Nikolai Fedorovich Chervov, chief of the Disarmament Office in the USSR Ministry of Defense, by START correspondent Branko Vlahovic—date and place not given]

[Text] Colonel General Nikolai Fedorovich Chervov is one of the best informed Soviet military leaders on disarmament because he heads the Disarmament Office in the Ministry of Defense. He and Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, chief of the General Staff, are the main Soviet military negotiators. Chervov has participated in all Soviet-American conversations on the subject and is truly authoritative for answers to the most urgent questions in relations between the superpowers.

The interview consisted of two lengthy conversations, the first on the eve of the Moscow summit and the second several days later. We were interested in finding out how optimistic the Soviets were on the eve of the meeting, what was most important to them and what they would insist on. Afterwards we wanted to find what is not discussed in official communications.

General Chervov is worth talking to; he is exhaustive and uses words clear to everyone in explaining every Soviet stand, the resistance and pressure of the Americans, and the suggestions coming from people in the "competing camp." He is not burdened by diplomatic phraseology or by constant caution about saying more than he ought to. From such a conversation one learns more than in a month of reading all the Soviet weeklies and dailies taken together. On the eve of the meeting of the two chiefs of state, he told us that it would be a great disappointment if the Americans did not ratify the agreement signed in Washington by Reagan and Gorbachev on the elimination of medium- and short-range missiles: "The Moscow meeting is very important as a continuation of the dialog, but expectations that something spectacular can be achieved are not realistic. Progress depends primarily on what the American side will suggest; if Reagan comes empty-handed, then little will be achieved."

Regardless of the fact that a great deal has been written about the meeting, the public has learned little about disputed details, i.e., about the crux of the issues relating to disarmament. Unfortunately, we have only received formal communiques from the meetings of defense ministers Yazov and Carlucci. Reagan's meeting with dissidents and persons refused permission to emigrate and the interviews of Boris Yeltsin have overshadowed the most important question on the agenda, disarmament.

And while in the first part of his conversation Chervov quite clearly presented the Soviet positions and his own evaluations, he began to avoid direct answers when at the end we asked him about his salary. With a laugh he responded, "I have enough. I live well and I don't need any more." Despite all our persistence, he did not waver and all we could get from him was, "Things are fine for me, my children are taken care of, and I will soon retire. I am satisfied with everything."

[Question]: Gorbachev has stated that he is ready to meet with Reagan once more (a fifth time) if at that time they could sign an agreement to eliminate 50 percent of strategic missiles. How realistic is this?

[Chervov]: First of all, we should explain why we did not succeed in preparing the text of the agreement for the Moscow meeting. There are many reasons. First of all, that agreement is much more complicated than the one signed in Washington, and there are several problems for which we have not yet found a compromise. But we should not exaggerate. We have after all come a long ways in negotiations, and now the most important thing is to preserve the so-called Washington formula, including the agreement on anti-missile defense signed in 1972. The "Washington formula" is fundamental and important. If it is interpreted literally, it is clear how many rockets and weapons in general any particular country can have. The most difficult problem is posed by cruise missiles on submarines, ships and aircraft. We have agreed with Washington that each country should be allowed a definite number of those missiles, but we must determine how many that will be. We have proposed 400 atomic cruise missiles on ships plus 600 without nuclear warheads. At the moment the Americans have not offered their number. It is difficult to find a common solution concerning inspection, for we propose the so-called distance method, while the Americans don't accept that but have not offered their own recommendation. They assert that it is enough to make a declaration of cooperation, and then to take each other's word. In that case each country can violate the agreement. The USSR also proposes that cruise missiles be put only on one or two types of submarines and the same number of ship types. I am convinced that, technically, an agreement can be prepared within three months at the latest, but there must be more political good will. If the politicians could agree with each other, the experts could do their jobs quickly. The answer to your questions would be formulated this way: A fifth summit meeting is possible. If the American side shows more political will, a new agreement could be signed by the end of the year.

[Question] Only a few days after the Moscow summit American Secretary of Defense Carlucci spoke in Japan about the growing Soviet military threat.

[Chervov]: Carlucci is fighting for an increased military budget, and to justify that he must talk about how the danger of a Soviet attack is growing. The myth of the Soviet military threat is inflated in the West whenever they want to increase the military budget.

[Question] At the negotiations in Moscow, did you ask Carlucci to explain why he believes that the danger is increasing?

[Chervov] I discussed that topic with Mr. Carlucci twice and asked him two direct questions: What facts confirm that assertion and what data warn of the growth in Soviet and Warsaw pact armed forces. He could not give a specific answer to either one of the two questions. He spoke in general of war danger and the growth of the Soviet navy. And his assertions in Japan were unsubstantiated.

[Question] In your opinion, why did he speak that way in Japan?

[Chervov]: I think that will be clear to everyone after the explanation I have just offered. As for the problem of strategic disarmament, as you know we have not changed our positions. The American side categorically rejects every idea tied to on-site inspection when we are talking about cruise missiles on ships. It is as if they have forgotten that in Washington Gorbachev and Reagan agreed to limit the number of such rockets. As I said, we are suggesting that they be on one or two types of submarines and ships, while no missiles at all can be on other types of vessels. In order to implement that, there must be on-site inspection. The Soviet Union proposed to the United States a joint experiment, so-called distance inspection. To be specific, we have special equipment that makes it possible to determine precisely if there is a missile with an atomic warhead on a given vessel. We proposed to conduct the test in the Mediterranean.

[Question] How would that experiment have looked?

[Chervov]: Let the Americans sail up with two ships, one with atomic weapons and the other without them. Together with the Americans, we would look on our equipment to determine where there were atomic weapons. That equipment for discovering atomic weapons can be put on a ship or a helicopter, but the Americans do not want that kind of inspection.

[Question]: Can you imagine why?

[Chervov]: That is perfectly clear. It is because they continue to produce and mount cruise missiles on ships and submarines.

[Question] Why were the Japanese military leaders upset after hearing the Soviet suggestion for inspection?

[Chervov]: The Japanese are afraid that our devices will discover that there are atomic weapons on their ships as well. As you know, the Japanese accepted the obligation that they would not produce atomic weapons or receive ships carrying them in their ports. I repeat, I was present at two meetings between Yazov and Carlucci, and both times the American was unable to say what basis he had

for stating that the Soviet military threat was growing. And yet here again they are talking about it in Japan. Those are the most common propaganda games, but the people are not duped so easily anymore. To many it is clear that we honestly want disarmament.

[Question] As long as we are talking about Carlucci, can you give details about what the two ministers discussed in Moscow? What was agreed-upon regarding military cooperation between the two superpowers?

[Chervov]: In Moscow they continued the talks begun in Bern in March. Carlucci and Yazov met twice in Moscow, and the topic was military doctrines. Let's say, for example, that Carlucci was interested in the principle of "reasonable sufficiency," which was also discussed in Bern. Secondly, it is unnatural that the two superpowers, which have the most atomic weapons after World War II, should not collaborate at the level of military leadership. That has now come up on the agenda as the fruit of improvements in international relations, but no discussion has determined what kind of contacts there should be. It is important that the two ministers have agreed that such contacts are necessary and that they have given the assignment to the two chiefs of the General Staffs, Marshal Akhromeyev and Admiral Crone, to discuss the issue in detail in July when our delegation is in the United States. Admiral Crone has invited Marshal Akhromeyev to Washington in July to make an agreement on military collaboration.

[Question]: Will you also go to the United States?

[Chervov]: Yes, I will go too.

[Question]: Then you can tell us specifically what you will do in Washington...?

[Chervov]: If we succeed in reaching agreement, a document on collaboration will be signed that will tell it all.

[Question]: Yazov and Carlucci also discussed recent incidents at sea...

[Chervov]: Among other things, the two of them talked about ways to avoid incidents on land, at sea and in the air, and they also discussed concrete incidents in the Black Sea. Carlucci suggested that at the meeting in Washington, the agenda for Akhromeyev and Crone should include that question, so that the two chiefs of the general staffs can establish principles that will help prevent further incidents. It has been suggested that consultations be held at least once a year to discuss such matters.

[Question]: As early as the Yazov-Carlucci meeting in Bern the American secretary of defense suggested a procedure for positioning instruments in space that would send information back to earth. What is your reply to that suggestion?

[Chervov] We don't believe that deploying such instruments in space would solve the problem of strategic missiles. The technology already exists for getting meteorological and other information from space, and the Americans now wish to expand that technology which can not only provide information and give warning of a rocket attack, but if connected to weapons, can guide a projectile. Thus such devices are not only means for collecting information from space, but also for controlling rockets, which is forbidden by the anti-ballistic missile treaty. We explained to Carlucci that we have nothing against obtaining information from space, but that we will not permit the launching of technological devices that can be used to control missiles. Then Carlucci suggested that the experts continue to discuss this proposal. I have nothing against that, let them discuss it.

[Question]: At one of the press conferences at the Moscow summit it was said that Yazov and Carlucci discussed the Iran-Iraq war, but the public was not informed about the content of the discussion. Can you say any more about it?

[Chervov]: It is true that they talked about that absurd war and agreed that it should end as soon as possible. They also agreed that neither country, the USSR nor the United States, is selling armaments to the belligerents. For example, Carlucci said that he was convinced that the USSR was not selling weapons to Iran.

[Question]: Yet in the West one often reads that the USSR is doing exactly that in order to prolong the war.

[Chervov] I repeat to you that Carlucci said that he believes and knows that we are not selling arms to Iran. Why they write untruths in the West, they will have to say.

[Question]: Iraqis fire on Iranian cities with Soviet missiles. Did Yazov and Carlucci talk about that as well?

[Chervov]: Yes, they covered that topic too. Yazov explained that some ten years ago we sold Iraq missiles with a range of up to 300 km. But later the Iraqis, with the help of Brazil, as the press states, succeeded in modernizing and altering them, so that now they can hit Iranian cities. I would remind you that every rocket can be altered, and that is a relatively simple procedure. The Iraqis strengthened the engine and reduced the weight of the warhead, so that the missile can go farther. But I want to stress that those are no longer the missiles we sold them. Here is why I think that. According to the agreement on intermediate-range missiles, any rocket can be altered by 5 percent, but anything beyond that makes it not a modernization but a new type of rocket. Therefore those Iraqi rockets are a new type.

[Question]: On the eve of the Moscow meeting, in the West there were predictions that the Soviet Union would voluntarily reduce significantly its troops in Europe and its so-called conventional weapons. Was there really consideration of such a move?

[Chervov]: In general that is not true. Let them speculate as much as they want in the West. The Soviet Union is ready for any kind of a reduction, but only if the other side does the same thing.

[Question]: The Soviet Union nevertheless came out with new initiatives in Moscow. But in the West they don't write about them, nor do your papers explain or even mention them.

[Chervov]: They are silent about our new initiative in the West on purpose, and I am amazed as to why our newspapers do not write about it. For that reason I will be glad to have your readers read about what we are offering in continuing disarmament. Since for years they have claimed in the West that we have the advantage in conventional weapons, I propose that we determine everything precisely, so that people can see who is right, for we believe that the western assessments are incorrect. It is true that there is an imbalance - we have more tanks, while they have the attack airplanes and helicopters. As a whole, however, there is a balance between the two military alliances. How can we prove who is right? Now, together with our allies, we propose to exchange data, from the number of soldiers to the amount of weapons. Thus both alliances, as well as each country individually, would come away with the facts. At the same time each side would give its estimates and evaluations about the strength of the other block and each individual country in terms of soldiers and technology. From the West we hear that they publish such data, but we answer that we want to have data that the governments of the countries stand behind.

[Question]: That is not a new idea...

[Chervov]: What follows is new. In Moscow we proposed that after publication of the facts, on-site inspections be set up from the Atlantic to the Urals. Without that we can't believe one another. If the NATO countries really think that we have the advantage, let them accept our proposal and publish official data, and then let us conduct joint inspections.

[Question]: What, in your opinion, would such an inspection show?

[Chervov]: I am convinced that the numbers that the governments of countries would publish about military forces would have to be corrected. It is particularly important that this suggestion be accepted, because it would open up the entire territory from the Atlantic to the Urals. It is also an important matter of principle, because we would get the same numbers, and then we could more easily come to understandings and agreements on the reduction of armed forces. Secondly, we could also resolve the question of the imbalances that have existed since World War II. In Moscow, we proposed once again that both alliances reduce their number of soldiers by 500,000.

[Question]: What was the response of the Americans and other NATO nations?

[Chervov]: So far there has been none. After our proposal, it is difficult for them to constantly repeat that we have the advantage. Let the inspection say who has how many weapons. Until we accept the idea of on-site inspection, we will continue to accuse one another. I believe that some NATO countries at least will see that our idea is a good one.

[Question]: If the Americans don't want to accept your idea, do they have another one of their own?

[Chervov]: We are ready to listen to their proposals, but they are silent. For the moment the NATO nations, as our people say, have ~~say~~ "neither answers nor greetings."

[Question]: It is pretty hard to negotiate in that situation....

[Chervov]: Right now our negotiations remind one of a twin-engine plane that is flying on only one engine, because the other is broken.

[Question]: On the eve of the summit, writing in the West also mentioned withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Warsaw Pact countries. How much truth was there in that, and is such a day coming?

[Chervov]: Before the Moscow summit there were many such assertions, but that is not correct. It is not realistic to expect the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from allied countries until agreement is reached that the other military alliance will do the same. I would remind you that the Warsaw Pact members have already declared that they are ready to eliminate military bases if NATO does the same. Thus, we are ready for an agreement, for without reciprocity there is no success in disarmament.

[Question]: There is a proposal from the FRG for a radical reduction of armed forces and military potential. What do you think of Admiral Schmukle's proposal?

[Chervov]: I know the admiral and I support him the idea in principle, but he has not developed it. It is clear that it cannot be done radically, all at once. Here is why I think so. If we agree on disarmament by stages, and that is the only realistic approach, we must take care to ensure that at some point in the process one side does not gain superiority. At all stages, then, some inspection and control is needed. It is easy to say that the number of tanks should be reduced to 10,000, but much more difficult to devise how that can be done. The German admiral did not do that. I repeat that in principle, I agree with the proposal that we should reduce military potential to the minimum. According to that proposal, the countries would only have what is needed for their individual protection. You have to realize that Europe is crammed with weapons. Armies of 3 million soldiers each are facing each other. At times it seems that some forget that Europe can destroy itself without any atomic weapons at all.

[Question]: Let's return to the missiles. In the West they assert that the Soviet Union now wants to modernize its missiles. Is that true?

[Chervov]: No. We are not planning any sort of modernization. In the West they write about that because they want to justify their so-called compensation for the missiles that have to be dismantled and destroyed.

[Question]: The Moscow summit showed as well that there are great differences related to the SDI program. You continue to insist that there can be no experimentation in outer space.

[Chervov]: We have suggested to the Americans that we write into a place in the protocol the points on which we disagree concerning the so-called strategic defense initiative (SDI), or "star wars." I would remind you that the fifth article of the anti-ballistic missile treaty forbids testing armaments and weapons components in outer space. If we were to permit that, we would open the doors to the positioning of weapons in outer space. We are decisively against that.

[Question]: What differences now exist when we consider so-called mobile missiles?

[Chervov]: Despite the fact that the Americans have changed their stand several times, I believe that we can reach agreement on that. Right now the most important thing is to agree on how many missiles of that type each country can have. Obviously, we must also determine the inspection system. As far as ballistic missiles on submarines, they need to be put into a composite, within level 9, which totals 4,900 war heads on rockets both on land and on submarines. So far we have not agreed how many should be on land, and how many on submarines. We propose two variants - the first is that each country itself determine where it will have each category of missiles, while according to the second we would have 3,300 land-based missiles, and they would have 3,300 on ships. I believe we will reach agreement.

[Question]: If you do reach agreement on missiles, what is that worth if so-called binary weapons begin to be produced? Do you believe that the Americans can accept your proposal on a complete moratorium on the production of chemical weapons?

[Chervov]: Unfortunately, I am a pessimist in that regard. We have done a great deal to create a declaration according to which all countries would accept an obligation not to produce chemical weapons, but we came upon two obstacles, the last on the eve of signing. The first problem is inspection, for without strict inspection provisions there can be no success in disarmament. The socialist countries are ready to permit inspection of all production, while the United States and the NATO countries agree only to inspection of government production. Thus private firms and multinational corporations would remain outside inspection provisions. What

does that mean? Close to 60 percent of chemical production would avoid inspection, and under such conditions we cannot sign a convention. Another problem is the initiation and continuation of binary weapon production. It is absurd to sign a convention banning chemical weapons when production of an even more dangerous class of weapons has begun. At their meeting in Bern, Carlucci and Yazov also discussed that.

[Question]: How did the American Secretary of Defense justify the beginning of production of that exceptionally dangerous type of chemical weapon.

[Chervov]: He openly told us that the Americans cannot agree to destroy chemical weapons entirely, for as long as "there exist governments that can produce such weapons and eventually attack us, we cannot completely destroy chemical weapons." As an example of this potential danger, he suggested Qadhafi.

[Question]: From that it follows that the arms race will continue, only with a different, no less dangerous type of weapon.

[Chervov]: I agree.

[Question]: That example also shows that you don't trust each other...

[Chervov]: That has long been known. Precisely because of that we cannot solve all the problems. When we spoke about cruise missiles, the Americans suggested that two types of their aircraft and two of ours should land at the same airport so that the experts could say how many missiles each plane could carry. To be specific, at the negotiations the Americans wanted to figure that each plane could carry ten rockets, which is unrealistic. We know that the American B-52 bomber can carry 12 cruise missiles, even 20, while the B-1 carries from 22 to 28. We suggested to the Americans that we land at the same airport our TU-95 and TU-160, but they demurred, saying that "We can't let you into the plane to see its equipment." Yet we can let them into our most advanced TU-160! If true inspection is to be conducted, the experts must be able to see what should be seen. Unfortunately, it is ever more apparent that distrust is the big obstacle.

[Question]: Everybody knows that in the United States some governmental and military leaders do not want to eliminate missiles. Are there some among Soviet officers who oppose disarmament?

[Chervov]: Our officers are party members. To the people it is completely clear that disarmament is the only way to save humanity. What is more, many proposals on such matters have come precisely from military leaders.

[Question]: People often ask why so much money was spent on weapons that are now going to be destroyed.

[Chervov]: What is to be done? That had to be because of the arms race, and that began right after the war. It leads to a dead end, that is clear to us, but we had to chase after the United States. When we tried to convince Kissinger to stop production, he told us "you are 10 years behind us in the production of certain kinds of weapons." What choice did we have but to continue to try to catch up? So from 1975 to 1980 we doubled the number of warheads. I would like to mention one other reason why our officers and our entire nation supports radical disarmament. The economic plans adopted by the 27th Congress can only be achieved if money is redirected.

[Question]: In the Soviet Union there are more than a few people who maintain that military personnel receive markedly more pay than other specialists. How much truth is there in that?

[Chervov]: Perhaps officers and generals have higher pay. I have not compared them, so I don't know, but you must remember that a soldier is here today and somewhere else tomorrow. After every move, things look as if there had been a fire. I would like to raise another point as well—pay is not always a good index of living standard.

[Question]: How much pay does a beginning officer receive, and how much a general?

[Chervov]: Beginners receive from 200 to 250, while generals get about 450. Pay in the military depends on position.

[Question]: We have held for last the question that is often asked today, as we approach the end of Reagan's term in office. Could it happen that the new American president and his administration will cancel everything that has been achieved and stop disarmament?

[Chervov]: It would be better to ask the Americans about that. But I am an optimist. I am convinced that it would be difficult, regardless of who the president is, to stop the disarmament process. It will continue, but the main question is how fast it will be.

Scientific Fact Must Back Political View of Disarmament

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[Article by Aleksey Georgiyevich Arbatov, doctor of historical sciences, head of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO Disarmament and Security Department: "Deep Cuts in Strategic Arms"]

[Text] This article, publication of which will be completed in the next issue of the journal, illustrates key problems of the negotiations between the USSR and the United States on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms. It analyzes questions of the preservation of the ABM Treaty and the role and place of an accord on the timeframe of nonwithdrawal from this treaty. The prospects of the complete elimination of strategic arms and attendant questions of disarmament and a strengthening of security are studied. The main aspects of the treaty as a 50 percent cut in strategic arms which is in preparation, in the context of a strengthening of the stability of the military-strategic balance at lower levels of nuclear arsenals included, are examined also.

Following the signing in Washington of the INF Treaty, the question of a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms (SOA) has taken pride of place on the disarmament agenda. From the viewpoint of an improvement in Soviet-American relations and the recovery of the entire international atmosphere the importance of a treaty on a significant lowering of the levels of the two biggest strategic potentials is obvious and needs no explanation. But the military-strategic aspect of the question is no less significant.

For example, currently, as is known, over 20,000 nuclear weapons are deployed altogether in the strategic forces of the USSR and the United States. Comparatively small numbers of them may be retargeted at facilities in Europe and Asia which were previously threatened by attack on the part of approximately 2,200 warheads of medium- and shorter-range missiles. A 50 percent reduction in strategic missiles would make such retargeting more difficult. Considering the makeup of the two powers' strategic forces, a 50-percent cut would in itself, probably, entail the elimination for the USSR and the United States of a sum total of over 2,000 deployed missiles and aircraft, over 70 missile-firing nuclear submarines and more than 10,000 nuclear warheads. A further reduction in SOA, in which more than 90 percent of destructive nuclear power in the world is concentrated, will be the central direction of the process of a lessening and, ultimately, the complete removal of the nuclear threat.

A number of steps in the direction of the new treaty was taken at the Washington meeting of the leaders of the USSR and the United States. The representatives of the two powers in Geneva were instructed to strive for the

completion of the formulation of the treaty, preferably by the next summit in the first half of 1988. Specifically, the joint statement reflected certain new agreed parameters of the future treaty, to other points it was decided to pay increased attention.¹

At the same time many questions await solution. It would seem important to dwell particularly on three points. First, the embodiment in a mutually acceptable form of an agreement concerning compliance with the ABM Treaty as an inalienable condition of a reduction in SOA. Second, it is a question of the ultimate goal of a reduction in strategic offensive arms. And, third, it is essential to ascertain the first cause of the remaining disagreements on a multitude of questions directly connected with the stage under discussion of deep cuts therein—a 50 percent reduction.

In connection with the examination of these complex problems the time has come to finally begin an open discussion of certain important procedural questions also. A hidden polemic between two currents has long been under way in circles of Soviet political scientists dealing with problems of international security and disarmament. The representatives of one of them believe that study of these topics requires in-depth knowledge of military strategy, weapons systems and the military balance of forces. The adherents to the other maintain that the main thing is policy and that military-technical details, "pieces of iron," so to speak, merely distract the analysis from the main issues. The disagreements between the "technocrats" and "politicians," as the representatives of these two informal schools sometimes call one another, not without sarcasm (summoning up associations with the arguments on other issues of the "physicists" and "lyric poets" in the 1960's), are of more than purely academic significance. Taking different approaches as a basis, individual specialists in the United States and Canada Institute, the IMEMO and other research centers frequently reach dissimilar conclusions on identical problems.

The profound restructuring of Soviet foreign policy and its unprecedented dynamic character, which is perceptible particularly in the disarmament sphere, where it has already produced the first good results, naturally presuppose the existence of different viewpoints, an open struggle of opinions and constructive debate, on the most important problems of disarmament, security and military sufficiency included. "There was a time when acute topics were not broached and opinions, innocuous even, but differing from official opinions, were not expressed," USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze observed. "This time is now gone."²

Only thus may a serious scientific basis for practical activity be developed. The big interest in the opinion of scientists being displayed currently by the foreign policy departments of state of the Soviet Union confronts science with increased demands.

The SDI Program and Compliance With the ABM Treaty

Soviet scientific literature of recent times has thoroughly examined the destabilizing consequences of a possible broad-based ABM system with space-based components. They could have a negative effect on the prospects of preservation of the ABM Treaty and the possibilities of the prohibition of ASAT weapons systems and other space-based assault systems. This is directly related to the stability of the military-strategic balance between the USSR and the United States and the possibility of deep cuts in SOA and prevention of the development of third-generation nuclear weapons. The course of events will play an important part for a reduction in the economic costs of military rivalry. The international-political situation in the broadest meaning of the word, including the security of the allies of the great powers and other countries, will depend on the state of affairs in this sphere.³

The joint statement of 10 December 1987 set the goal of the achievement of an accord on compliance with the ABM Treaty "in the form in which it was signed in 1972 in the process of the research, development and, if necessary, testing which are authorized in accordance with the ABM Treaty." The parties will undertake not to withdraw from the treaty within an agreed timeframe. Intensive negotiations are to begin within 3 years prior to its expiry, but if the parties do not come to an agreement otherwise, each will have the right to determine its modus operandi itself. This accord should have the same legal status as the treaty on SOA, the ABM Treaty and other agreements.⁴

The logic of the powers' mutual undertaking not to avail themselves within a particular timeframe of the right to withdraw from the treaty (which is recorded in article XV with the condition of 6 months' notification) is based on the following considerations. The sovereign right of each state which is a party to any treaty is the possibility, given certain conditions, of withdrawing from it, and no one intends depriving the United States and the USSR of this right in respect of the ABM Treaty. But if the parties negotiate deep cuts in SOA, then—in view of the objective organic relationship of offensive and defensive arms—additional safeguards for ensuring certainty in this important sphere will be necessary. In other words, assurances are needed that a major reduction in the level of offensive strategic potentials will take place under conditions of strict compliance with the limitations on defensive systems. Otherwise a reduction in strategic arms could, instead of strengthening stability, facilitate the collapse thereof. This conclusion is based on the premise that the party which at some stage decides, after all, to withdraw from the treaty and create broad-based ABM defenses could ensure its greater efficiency the fewer its remaining intercept targets, that is, ballistic missiles and their warheads.

Key significance in the wording of the statement is attached to the words concerning compliance with the treaty "in the form in which it was signed in 1972."

Their import cannot signify anything other, it would seem, than the illegality of the so-called "broad interpretation," in accordance with which the testing in space of ABM componentry and systems based on new physical principles (laser, microwave charged-particle beam and others) is allegedly permitted. In fact the parties subscribed in Washington to the original, truly correct interpretation of the treaty, whereby the testing of ABM systems and componentry based on new physical principles is possible only if they are in permanent ground-based mode. And their deployment is to be the subject of a special accord lest there be a violation of the strict quantitative, qualitative and territorial limitations of article III of the treaty and the 1974 protocol thereto (in accordance with which there may be just one ABM deployment area).

At the same time, however, the accord on nonwithdrawal within an agreed timeframe from the treaty, which is in terms of its status of unlimited duration, should not be seen as a kind of agreement on its virtually automatic cessation upon the expiry of this timeframe. In accordance with article XV of the treaty, withdrawal therefrom is not permitted, for example, simply in view of the successful development of one's engineering programs affording a prospect of effective ABM defense of a territory. Either party may do such only if "it decides that the exceptional circumstances connected with the content of this treaty have jeopardized its highest interests."⁵ This means that the United States could, for example, withdraw from the treaty owing to its violation by the Soviet Union or in connection with an increase in the latter's offensive nuclear forces.

But the USSR has no intention of violating the treaty and proposes the settlement to mutual satisfaction of all disagreements on questions of compliance therewith (the decision to freeze for a year the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar station is geared to this also). In turn, it is proposed reducing strategic arms by 50 percent and subsequently to even lower levels, that is, the threat of offensive nuclear arms will diminish—given the permanency of the antimissile arms limitation practice.

It is therefore important to guarantee that the opponents of the treaty cannot in exchange for an undertaking on nonwithdrawal within a particular timeframe predetermine the cessation thereof following the expiration of this period, regardless of the letter and spirit of article XV. Unfortunately, it is this arbitrary interpretation of this approach which has been encountered increasingly often in the United States recently. Furthermore, it may be concluded that, having been unable to smash the treaty head-on (which was demonstrated by Sen. S. Nunn's report in 1987 and the resolution of Congress passed on the basis thereof essentially rejecting the "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty), the devotees of an ABM space-based system are now putting their hopes increasingly in the cessation thereof upon the completion of the nonwithdrawal term. They are putting the main emphasis on a phrase in the joint statement

saying that "provided the parties do not agree otherwise, each party will have the right to determine its modus operandi itself." These circles are hoping that they will now succeed in continuing the space-based ABM system on the pretext of the creation of "trump cards" for negotiations "from a position of strength" on the mode of strategic relations of the USSR and the United States after the expiry of the nonwithdrawal period. Specifically, in January 1988 the American side submitted the draft "Treaty Between the United States and the USSR on Certain Measures Contributing to the Transition on the Basis of Cooperation to the Deployment of Future Strategic Defenses Against Ballistic Missiles."⁶ The desire is to hereby impart to the SDI program, which in 1986-1987 came in for increasingly sharp criticism from the viewpoint of technical-strategic justifiability and from appropriations for which Congress has cut increasingly substantial amounts, a "second wind."

There will have to be, it would seem, in a subsequent Soviet-American accord on compliance with the treaty complete clarity in respect of the fact that "the right to determine one's modus operandi" by no means nullifies the wording of article XV of the treaty and that the period of nonwithdrawal absolutely does not imply a limitation on the term of validity of this agreement of unlimited duration.

A political analysis of the problem taking into consideration both the role of the treaty in Soviet-American relations and the system and process of arms limitation and the domestic political situation in the United States leads to these conclusions. However, this analysis would be manifestly incomplete without an examination of the strategic and military-technical aspects of the problem.

The opinion of the majority of experts agrees that owing to the "immaturity" of exotic ABM space-based technology the question of the feasibility of a broad-based ABM defense will not be clear before the mid-1990's, while the full-scale testing of its components and the deployment of such a system are a matter for the end of the 1990s-start of the 21st century, at least. The difficulties which the plan for the "early deployment" of a space-based ABM defense in 1987 has encountered in the United States were yet further graphic confirmation of this. In the foreseeable period, while deployment of a space-based ABM system is not on the agenda, the key question technically and strategically is the interpretation of the treaty's restrictive provisions in respect of specific ABM and space-based programs. And it is important here that Washington not attempt, by hook or by crook, as they say, to once more resurrect for its consent to assume a formal undertaking on nonwithdrawal the "broad interpretation" of a number of articles of the treaty. It is no secret that interested circles are attempting to portray the realization of SDI projects as not being in violation of the terms of the treaty. For this SDI components are being presented as "test models" and "subcomponents," and testing, as "experiments," and attempts are being made to portray experiments

involving space-based systems as tests involving the putting of devices in space not in orbit but on a pre-orbital ballistic trajectory and so forth. The United States delegation at the Geneva negotiations has as of the start of 1988 resumed attempts to uphold the "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty, maintaining that the experiments and testing of a number of SDI components are permitted by the joint Soviet-American statement at the Washington meeting.⁷

Verifiable limitations on such work in keeping with the authentic interpretation of the terms of ABM limitation would be a most important actual safeguard against a surprise spurt ahead by either power in the space-based ABM sphere. And there arises with all seriousness in this connection the need for an accord on the limits of permitted research in the sphere of ABM defenses based on new physical principles, specifically with respect to the specifications of the devices put into space and the operations which they perform. R&D in this sphere is a long and costly process which it is difficult to conceal. If in the course of the development thereof agreed limits were violated, the other party would have sufficient time to adopt military-technical, political, international-legal and other countermeasures. If, however, there are no such limitations and programs of military-technical efforts and experiments become far advanced in an atmosphere of uncertainty, the treaty's restrictive significance could be gradually eroded even without formal withdrawal from it. And this would predetermine the cessation thereof after the expiry of the nonwithdrawal period.

While not in the least belittling the political role of the undertaking on nonwithdrawal from the treaty it is necessary not to lose sight of the military-strategic aspects either. As a document in international law, such an undertaking would be as dependable as the military-strategic deterrent factors are strong. If they are inadequate for preventing the denunciation or the simply perfidious violation of the ABM Treaty—the cornerstone of the entire international system of arms limitation—the situation could hardly be saved by an additional nonwithdrawal undertaking (the less so in that the American side is insisting on the incorporation in the undertaking also of reservations permitting, given certain conditions, renunciation of compliance with the nonwithdrawal timeframe).

The main military-strategic factor actually influencing the plans for the creation based on the SDI of a global ABM system with space-based echelons is the probability of countermeasures on the part of the other side. The Soviet Union has adopted the optimum policy in this respect, declaring that its retaliatory steps would be asymmetrical to the SDI program and less costly and would require a shorter timeframe.

The most effective such measure, it would seem to us, would be the development of systems directly combating the ABM space-based echelons with the use of nuclear

and kinetic weapons and directed-energy systems and also EW weapons—ground-, sea-, air- and, if necessary, space-based. They would be intended not for the annihilation of the population and material assets of the United States but for the destruction of space-based attack arms and disruption of the functioning of its observation, tracking, control and communications systems. In addition, it is a question of ensuring for the weapons countering space-based ABM defenses high survivability and imparting to them sufficient invulnerability both to a strike by the United States' offensive nuclear weapons and the impact of American space-based arms.

Undoubtedly, from the political viewpoint the process of deep cuts in SOA would in itself weaken support for the SDI in the United States and strengthen the popularity of the ABM Treaty. It is natural to ask, however, would not a radical reduction in SOA facilitate the creation subsequently of a more efficient ABM system or, simply put, would not a reduction in strategic arms by half make the creation in the future of a space-based ABM system twice as easy or half as costly? And in this case also the political analysis should be buttressed by evaluations of a strategic and military-technical nature.

First, many studies show convincingly that the effectiveness of a space-based ABM system (employing DEW weapons included) would in the broad range of correlations of forces depend not only on the quantity of the other side's strategic missiles but even more on their qualitative specifications (specifically, the time of the boost phase of the trajectory, the speed of separation of the warheads and the perfection of the decoys) and also on the modes of basing, tactics of use and efficacy of the weapons directly combating the ABM space-based echelons.⁸

Second, the components of the ABM system being developed within the framework of the SDI program are geared directly to the interception of existing types of Soviet ground- and sea-launched ballistic missiles and the modifications thereof anticipated in the foreseeable period. Considering the tremendous approximate cost of a multi-echelon ABM system, those carrying out the SDI program are gambling on the retaliatory measures costing the Soviet Union relatively (or even absolutely) more. The hope is expressed here that the USSR will take the costliest and least profitable path of an "extensive" buildup of its existing types of missile forces and that this will divert its resources from their qualitative upgrading.

Third, the main calculation is being made on the fact that the Soviet Union, with its traditionally big reliance on defensive weapons (specifically, expressed in the maintenance of a broad-based ABM system and one permitted ABM complex around Moscow), will for all that not stick to the policy of "asymmetrical retaliatory measures" and will be pulled into rivalry in costly space- and ground-based ABM systems. In such a competition,

the supporters of SDI hope, many geostrategic and technical disproportions would begin to work to the USSR's disadvantage. In a certain sense the tasks of an American ABM defense in this context would be made noticeably easier: its efficiency would be gauged not only and not so much in comparison with Soviet offensive arms and counterweapons as in comparison with the Soviet ABM system as such. An arms race in this sphere would, moreover, divert forces and resources from systems for directly countering the space-based components of an American ABM defense.

Thus a 50 percent cut in SOA would indeed exert little influence on the efficiency of a probable American ABM defense in the technical respect. But at the same time it would in a certain sense facilitate, if necessary, the adoption of countermeasures in response to the deployment of a U.S. ABM system. Finally, as a final measure, there would always remain the possibility of once again building up SOA to the present levels and higher were this deemed expedient. Such a step could be effected far more rapidly and at less cost than that which would be required for the full-scale testing and deployment of a multi-echelon American ABM system with space-based components.

At the same time the said possible measures of political and military-technical counteraction of the development of new space-based ABM systems do not remove the need for special steps to ensure compliance with the ABM Treaty. They would be necessary even in the event of the United States' unequivocal renunciation of the "broad interpretation" thereof. An accord on the timeframe of nonwithdrawal from the treaty could be used for the achievement within an agreed time of mutually acceptable agreements on these questions.

Military-technical progress creates the danger of the increasingly great erosion of the restrictive framework of the treaty and the parties' increased mutual fears and suspicions in connection with development in related strategic and technical spheres. An ABM defense for combating tactical ballistic missiles, new air defense weapons, ASAT arms, qualitatively new space-based power-supply, observation, tracking, communications and battle management systems, ground-based laser devices with space-based reflector mirrors and such could be such spheres. Many of them are not currently covered by the treaty directly, but could from various directions lead to an erosion of its restrictive terms. Some of these systems will objectively possess this degree or the other of ballistic missile intercept potential, others will open channels for an upgrading of technology to levels close to the requirements of a space-based ABM defense and, finally, yet others will make extremely difficult the monitoring of compliance with the treaty, differentiation between prohibited and permitted activity and verification of compliance with the limitations on the testing and deployment even of space-based ABM systems.

The Problem of Eliminating Strategic Arms

An important subject of disagreements between the USSR and the United States is the ultimate goal of cuts in SOA. The Soviet Union advocates their complete elimination, even within a 10 year timeframe, possibly. The United States officially advocates the elimination only of ballistic missiles, but not heavy bombers and cruise missiles. True, this position is not taken seriously in American specialist circles. The vast majority of the latter supports, with this reservation or the other, a certain reduction, but not the complete elimination of strategic arms, including ballistic missiles.

A political analysis shows convincingly the unreliability and danger of a world based on the confrontation of growing nuclear potentials of general annihilation. The political importance and constructiveness of the declared goal of the complete elimination of strategic arms and all nuclear weapons is perfectly obvious. However, the far-reaching and multilevel nature and complexity of the set task are even more palpable in a military-strategic and military-technical context.

To begin with the fact that its accomplishment would mean (as of the state of affairs on 1 January 1988) the dismantling on both sides of a sum total of 2,390 ICBM launchers and the missiles themselves, 1,614 SLBM launchers, approximately 106 SSBN's and 750 heavy bombers.⁹ This means that both states must decommission an average of 475 missiles and aircraft and 10 submarines annually. And this on condition that over the 10-year period neither side commission a single new system and a single missile or bomber. Otherwise the scale of the cuts in compensation would be even greater. For comparison it may be recalled that in accordance with SALT I and SALT II both parties withdrew from the strategic forces over 15 years (1972-1987) approximately 900 ballistic missile launchers and heavy bombers and also 26 SSBN's, that is, an average of approximately 60 delivery systems and 2 submarines a year.¹⁰ It stands to reason that a dependable barrier to space-based arms has to be erected here. The ABM complexes and strategic air defense components which are permitted currently would evidently have to be eliminated also.

But granted the entire extent thereof, the physical parameters of the reductions are still not the most complex aspect of the problem. Considering the lengthy timeframe of the development, construction (10-15 years) and occurrence in effective combat strength (20-30 years) of strategic arms, an accord on the complete elimination of SOA in such a short time would essentially mean a simultaneous "freeze" on all programs for an upgrading of existing and the creation of new weapons systems (including a complete ban on nuclear testing) with the corresponding verification methods and modes. It would be essential also to ban the creation of other types of weapons of mass annihilation and to do away with existing stockpiles.

The political goal has been set and is not questioned either among specialists on international policy problems or among experts on military-strategic issues, who are wedded to the idea of ensuring security politically and not militarily and who really aspire to a rapid lessening and, ultimately, the complete removal of the threat of nuclear war. But it is the duty of these specialists to elaborate specific paths of progress toward the set goal with regard for political and military realities and reveal the relationship and mutual influence of various steps in this direction. It was for this that M.S. Gorbachev called, emphasizing that "politicians need scientific arguments and scientific conclusions for decision-making not only in respect of domestic but international issues also."¹¹

Strategic arms are not simply a "superstructure" of the most devastating weapons crowning modern military arsenals of which one may take hold and cut off in isolation. SOA are the pivot of the global strategic and military-political situation permeating its objective relationships. For example, the significance of the geostrategic asymmetry of the location of the USSR and the United States could increase anew given the elimination of global-range weapons. The impermissibility of the elimination of SOA returning the world to the period of the 1940's-1950's, when American territory was virtually beyond the reach of nuclear weapons owing to the USSR's lack of intercontinental delivery systems, while Soviet cities were within the range of American forward-based nuclear weapons, is perfectly obvious. Consequently, such arms have to be done away with in parallel, and it is a question, what is more, not only of the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles but also medium bombers of the two sides and airfield- and carrier-based operational-tactical strike aircraft.

Tactical nuclear weapons and battlefield nuclear weapons could hardly under such conditions remain outside of the framework of agreements.¹² Otherwise there would be considerable underpinning for the "limited" and "local nuclear war" concepts, which are currently manifestly groundless owing to the inevitable escalation of a nuclear conflict to a global catastrophe. Particularly in the eyes of the power the furthest away from the contemplated military theaters.

"Dual-capable" missiles are, in the main, the delivery systems of tactical nuclear weapons, and their range is increasing constantly, which would permit their use for delivering strategic strikes to a great depth also, at administrative and industrial targets included (we would recall that the warheads which destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki were, according to the modern classification, tactical in terms of yield).

The elimination of tactical nuclear weapons would, in turn, lead to the need for the adoption of large-scale disarmament measures in the sphere of conventional arms and armed forces. First, the technical aspect of the question. The destruction of tactical nuclear warheads

and prevention of the secret concealment if only of a small quantity thereof would be very difficult to monitor. A more dependable guarantee would be the elimination of the launch platforms and the delivery systems and missiles, the majority of which are dual-capable and are integrated in the conventional armed forces.¹³ This presupposes the dismantling of significant components of modern armies and, to an even greater extent, of air forces and navies and air defense.

Second, the presence of tactical nuclear weapons and plans for first use thereof in NATO armed forces have been justified traditionally by the alleged "significant superiority" of Warsaw Pact conventional arms and ground forces, of armored and mechanized formations particularly. The Warsaw Pact countries justifiably link deep cuts in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe and their restructuring on exclusively defensive principles with a reduction in dual-capable systems and the subsequent elimination of tactical nuclear weapons. Thus the inseparable relationship of conventional armed forces and tactical nuclear arms is obvious in the strategic plane also.

And, third, cuts in strategic offensive weapons themselves would at a certain stage pose the question of measures in relation to conventional or multipurpose weapons systems, plans for the use of which are directly associated with SOA in an operational respect. It is a question primarily of navies' ASW forces and weapons designed to combat missile-firing nuclear submarines. A substantial, if not preponderant, number of the operational assignments of the surface, submarine and air forces of the navies of the USSR, the United States and a number of their allies is being built around antisubmarine defense and combating the enemy's antisubmarine defenses. This also applies to air defense, where the radar detection and guidance systems, interceptor-fighters and surface-to-air missile complexes are oriented to a considerable extent against heavy bombers and cruise missiles, not to mention medium bombers and dual-capable operational-tactical attack aircraft.

Thus in accordance with the logic of the objectively existing mechanism of the strategic, operational and technical relationships of the various components of the global and regional military balance the complete removal of so important and central a "unit" thereof as SOA would inevitably call forth a "chain reaction" in the sphere of disarmament in a widening circle of nuclear and conventional elements. This would essentially mean a radical restructuring of the entire military-strategic situation in the world with the abolition of major components thereof on land, at sea and in the air.

However, besides the said vertical "chain reaction," the elimination of SOA and in this connection intermediate-range missiles and operational-tactical and tactical nuclear arms poses the question of the horizontal spread of disarmament measures. It is a question first of all, naturally, of the dismantling of all classes of nuclear

arms of Great Britain, France and the PRC and also of the elimination, per the above-mentioned logic, of certain components of their conventional armed forces.

Nuclear weapons are seen by these powers not only as means of ensuring their national security in the narrow sense but also as a factor of their political relations with the USSR and the United States, neighboring nonnuclear states (the FRG, Japan) and also the developing countries. These three powers' renunciation of nuclear status would most likely be accompanied by a number of political conditions pertaining to a restructuring of international relations globally and regionally, as, equally, a demand for additional disarmament measures and military assurances concerning neighboring countries.

The "politician" scientists must have their say in the study of these problems. But this say will be impressive only if an in-depth knowledge of military-strategic issues and their role and place in states' political relations is made the basis thereof. Such an approach demands a higher standard of analytical skill than simply military-technical and military-strategic assessments. But without the latter political analysis is just as impossible as higher mathematics without arithmetic.

Moreover, the nuclear disarmament of the said five powers would require a sharp tightening of the practice of nuclear nonproliferation. It is a question of verification of the existence of the corresponding warheads and, if necessary, their elimination and safeguards against the creation of nuclear weapons in the future (including conversion of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty into a multilateral treaty) by such states as Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, Iraq, Libya, South Korea, Brazil, Argentina and India. The same applies to chemical, bacteriological and other types of weapon of mass annihilation. The said measures obviously could not be some joint forcible action of the five nuclear powers. This would be both politically unacceptable and impermissible from the standpoint of international law and would, besides, evidently prove unfeasible in practice. Consequently, a solution of the question may be based only on the corresponding negotiations and mutually acceptable agreements, which, in turn, presupposes the settlement of a broad range of regional and domestic political and economic problems.

Verification and inspection measures represent a separate problem. They will have to encompass not only SOA but also other nuclear and nonnuclear arms and armed forces of many states, their military activity and the manufacturing and S&T facilities (including nuclear power engineering and enterprises manufacturing fissile materials) and also extend to a vast set of measures in the field of security and the settlement of international and domestic conflicts.

In posing the question of the complete elimination of strategic arms the Soviet leadership is undoubtedly aware of the entire complexity and military and political

multi-aspectuality of this action. Incidentally, the Soviet program for deliverance from nuclear weapons of 15 January 1986 also provides for a comprehensive approach to a solution of the problem, which has begun to be realized already in the INF Treaty and at various current negotiations in the disarmament sphere.

At the same time, however, the bulk of politicians of the West and military and civilian specialists, with whom, in actual fact, the negotiations on these issues will have to be conducted directly, consider such radical steps unrealistic and impracticable in the foreseeable future. But this does not mean that a basis for the parties' dialogue and interaction is lacking altogether.

While differing in their vision of the ultimate goals of a reduction in SOA, the parties have in principle a sizable contact zone—concerning the desirability and feasibility of the first major step on this path—a 50 percent reduction in delivery systems and nuclear weapons over the next few years.

Having in view a perfectly definite ultimate goal of the negotiations, however difficult it seems currently, the Soviet Union has a fundamental advantage over the United States. But a clear goal, granted all its importance, is not everything. On the agenda currently is the thorough elaboration based on the new thinking on security issues of the whole path of movement toward it and of its first stage particularly. And this stage must be marked off with the utmost precision not only from the viewpoint of the quantity of the weapons to be reduced but also in the sphere of the qualitative changes which will take place in the strategic correlation of forces and in the strength of the safeguards against a first strike given lower levels of the nuclear potentials. Obviously, strategic stability, which, according to prevailing ideas, characterizes the degree of probability of a nuclear war being unleashed, will by no means necessarily strengthen automatically in proportion to the reduction in the quantity of arms. If there is an increase in the vulnerability of the weapons remaining after the reduction, an additional stimulus to a preventive strike could arise, as a result of which the threat of nuclear war could hypothetically increase even.¹⁴

Specific measures of a 50 percent reduction in SOA should be inscribed in long-term plans providing for successive stages of movement toward the final goal and the opportune preparation of the attendant measures of disarmament and a strengthening of political security. They were discussed above and they go far beyond the framework of the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space-based arms. A clear ultimate goal is attractive primarily because it makes it possible to make political ways and means of ensuring security the cornerstone. That is, the achievement of a consistent series of agreements to which both diplomatic policy in Geneva and current military programs should be subordinated.

The American approach suffers primarily from the vagueness of the ultimate goal of the SOA reduction process. If it envisages an end to this process following the realization of 50 percent cuts or at some other lower level, it thereby knowingly undermines the officially proclaimed goal of "consolidating the stability of the strategic balance." After all, at whatever level the SOA reduction process is halted and however stable the balance recorded by the treaty is initially, S&T progress in the sphere of strategic systems and in related fields will in time inevitably erode this stability and create new means and methods capable of unleashing and waging a nuclear war. The vagueness of ultimate goal condemns U.S. policy in Geneva to follow the lead of programs for upgrading SOA. The American position at the negotiations, which has been very thoroughly worked out with reference to the stage of a 50 percent reduction in SOA, bears the manifest imprint of opportunist, exclusively pragmatic considerations, which, were they to be followed, could lead far away from the main goal: a lessening of the likelihood of nuclear war.

What can the supporters of the so-called "political" school, who deny the need for a study of "military specifics, say in this connection? No one is any longer to be persuaded at the present stage that there could be no winners in a nuclear war and that agreements on deep cuts in SOA are essential. There is no need for prolix argument about the fact that political ways of ensuring security are preferable and that individual disproportions of the strategic balance must not become obstacles in the way of agreements whose significance for general security far exceeds the importance of individual asymmetries. The political leadership of the USSR has not only unequivocally stated its viewpoint on these questions but has demonstrated in practice the resolve to abide by the principles of the new thinking, having achieved the signing of the INF Treaty.

But does this mean that any conditions of a 50 percent reduction in SOA are acceptable to the Soviet Union, particularly considering that there is as yet no mutual understanding between the parties concerning the next stage and ultimate goal of this path? Where is the boundary between permissible disproportions and serious "skewing" of the balance undermining stability? This is the terminus for "political lyric poetry," here it begins to walk in a closed circle of general phrases. A professional analysis of a multitude of specific issues is needed for further travel.

But perhaps diplomats and the military should be left to study the "pieces of iron" and tedious specifics, and the scientists left to solve truly major problems: such as to what extent is peace better than war and disarmament preferable to an arms race and policy from the viewpoint of security more important than military technology?

Such a division of labor would certainly make life far easier for the political scientists. But would it facilitate the development of a scientific basis for actual steps

pertaining to a strengthening of security—that is the question. Experience shows that as soon as one switches from abstract argument to the specific ways and methods of the practical embodiment of ideas, it is necessary at once to speak about strategy, weapons systems and the material content of the "balance," "parity," "equal security," "stability" and other concepts.

On such issues the scientists' responsibility is incomparably higher, as also is the risk of error, than in arguments concerning high "political" matters. But it is here that the importance of serious scientific analysis and a firm theoretical base is more important than anywhere. However, it should consist not of streamlined wording suitable for all practical occasions and handsome in its infallibility and uselessness but be based both on a knowledge of most intricate specifics in all their contradictoriness and ambivalence and on broad conceptual thinking taking as the starting point the new philosophy of security and not confined to quotidien routine and departmental specifics. It is this demand which now puts statesmen in the category of scientists and experts enlisted in the elaboration of foreign policy.

But are the representatives of our academic community always on a par with these demands at the present time, when practice has, as they say, turned to face science directly? Not always and in all things, it has to be admitted. The years of stagnation, estrangement from practice, artificial isolation and self-isolation have taken their toll in this sphere. This applies to this extent or the other to the science of international politics as a whole and, most, to its military-political and disarmament schools. Theoretical thought in this sphere was for many years covered by dense extraneous propaganda features and began to lose its capacity for independent, critical analysis.

Naturally, this has not gone unnoticed in the West, where an attentive watch is kept on our scientific publications and conclusions are drawn from discussions with representatives of Soviet science. This is what was written, for example, by the American specialist M. (Mayyer), a leader of MIT's Center for International Studies and a Pentagon consultant, explaining why he does not use the works of our scientists in his study of the military-political course of the USSR: "In the field in question here these authors have practically no information over and above what is published annually in the West in newspapers, journals and books (which serve as 'secret' sources to which they have open access). In addition, as academic representatives of the state, it is their special duty to justify official policy and portray it in the proper, that is, best, political and ideological light."¹⁵

An insulting opinion, of course. So I would like to repudiate it as a slander merely expressing the author's personal malevolence. Indeed, such a description is unduly indiscriminate and inapplicable to many Soviet scientists, who even in former times defended their own

viewpoint as far as possible and have now joined actively in the tackling of urgent practical tasks. Other American experts are more objective in their assessments. Specifically, R. (Legvold), director of the A. Harriman Institute for Study of the Soviet Union at Columbia University, observes that certain subdivisions in the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO and United States and Canada Institute are involved in close interaction with practical departments with far more important matters than pure propaganda.¹⁶

But, unfortunately, there is nonetheless a portion of truth even in the first opinion. It is not all up to the scientists, of course. A significant expansion of the publication of our own information, facts and evaluations, for example, without which scientific analysis is deprived of an elementary basis and is condemned to one-sidedness and isolation from real life. But nor are the representatives of the academic world always prepared to accept such information and integrate it in the system of profoundly considered concepts.

The Soviet Union understands this and is talking about it openly and setting the task of a fundamental change in the former state of affairs. Not, of course, to satisfy S. (Mayyer) and his ilk—their pronouncements are for us generally the least important problem. But primarily so that our theory correspond far more to the needs of Soviet foreign policy. As E.A. Shevardnadze pointed out, this "is no longer an idle demand but an iron necessity. Inordinately active practice racing ahead of sluggish theory or sluggish, flaccid theory concerned with how to serve practice somewhat more craftily have at times cost us dear."¹⁷

Footnotes

1. See PRAVDA, 12 December 1987.
2. VESTNIK MID SSSR No 2, 26 August 1987, p 33.
3. See "Weapons in Space: Security Dilemma," edited by Ye.P. Velikhov, R.Z. Sagdeev and A.A. Kokoshin, Moscow, 1986. "SDI: The American 'Star Wars' Program," USSR Academy of Sciences Commission for Assistance to Scientists, United States and Canada Institute and Space Research Institute, Moscow, 1987. "SDI: Dangers, Illusions, Alternative" (NOVOYE VREMYA, special supplement, 1987); "Disarmament and Security, 1986. Yearbook," Moscow, 1987.
4. See PRAVDA, 12 December 1987.
5. "Disarmament and Security, 1986. Yearbook," vol 2, p 202.
6. See PRAVDA, 24 January 1988.
7. See *ibid.*

8. See C. Gray, "Deterrence and Strategic Defense" ("The Strategic Defense Debate," edited by C. Snyder, Philadelphia, 1986, pp 170-182).

9. PRAVDA, 8 February 1988.

10. Estimated from PRAVDA, 17 March 1987.

11. PRAVDA, 17 January 1988.

12. It is a question of missile systems of the surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, air-to-ground, ship-to-ship and ship-to-air classes, aerial bombs, depth charges, torpedoes, ASW missiles, artillery projectiles, bombs and land mines and mortar systems. All told, the said systems at the present time number 5,000-10,000 boosters and delivery vehicles and more than 20,000 nuclear warheads.

13. The reference is to air force operational-tactical attack aircraft; base and carrier-based naval aircraft; air defense fighters and surface-to-air missiles; army tactical missiles and heavy artillery; large warships and submarines with missiles and dual-purpose torpedo and mortar shell arms.

14. See "Strategic Stability Under the Conditions of Radical Reductions in Nuclear Arms," Moscow, 1987, p 13.

15. "Hawks, Doves and Owls," edited by G. Allison, A. Carnesale, J. Nye Jr., New York, 1985, p 169.

16. See THE HARRIMAN INSTITUTE FORUM, January 1988, p 7.

17. VESTNIK MID SSSR No 1, 5 August 1987, p 19.

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**Prospects for Outcome of Vienna CSCE
Follow-Up Talks Weighed**
18160008e Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 4, Apr 88 pp 104-108

[Report by D. Yuryev: "At the Vienna Meeting"]

[Text] What sort of Europe will it be following the Soviet-American INF Treaty? Are "compensation" for the missiles to be removed—this means of considerable importance of "deterrence" policy on the European continent—and, consequently, the continuation here of the customary, military-power methods of ensuring security inevitable or, on the contrary, will the need for political dialogue and the close cooperation of both parts of Europe grow even more? Today, at a pivotal stage in

international relations, these questions are not the subject of abstract reflection in the stillness of offices. The answer to them contains the key to practical policy and the future of all Europeans.

The all-European equation is now being solved in Moscow, in Washington and in the capitals of all European countries. This is the priority task facing the Vienna meeting of representatives of participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which opened in November 1986.

Its fifth round began in January 1988. This is the third forum (after Belgrade in October 1977-March 1978 and Madrid in November 1980-September 1983) designed within the follow-up framework (further steps following the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) to provide for continuation of the all-European process. The particular significance of the meeting is that it got down to business under the conditions of the new time count which began in Reykjavik. Now, when in connection with the signing of the Soviet-American treaty on the elimination immediately of two classes of nuclear weapons, the prospects for an abrupt positive change in all European affairs are becoming increasingly real, the significance of the Vienna meeting is growing immeasurably. It is essential to complete it with results which support the dynamics of disarmament on the continent and bring all-European cooperation in all its dimensions—political, military, economic, ecological, humanitarian—to a qualitatively new level.

I

Particular significance since Washington has been attached in the all-European process to **military-political questions of security**. Whereas in Helsinki and subsequently in Madrid and at the Conference on Confidence-Building and Security Measures and Disarmament in Stockholm specific accords concerned mainly confidence-building measures in the military sphere, the question not only of the continued development of such measures but of a transition to an actual reduction in armed forces and conventional arms on a European scale is being tackled in Vienna. This task is fully in keeping with the Helsinki Final Act, which emphasized the interest of all participants in efforts aimed at a lessening of military confrontation and the promotion of disarmament. The summary document of the Madrid meeting contains an appeal for "the gradual implementation of new, effective and specific actions aimed at developing progress in confidence-building and security and in the achievement of disarmament."

In the course of the first rounds even the Warsaw Pact states opposed the attempts of the United States and its closest allies to take disarmament problems outside of the framework of the all-European process. They made the basis of their line a two-in-one approach: further elaboration of confidence-building and security measures and the start of negotiations on a reduction in

armed forces and conventional arms from the Atlantic to the Urals. The work should thus be performed in two parallel, but contiguous directions and within the framework, what is more—and this is of fundamental importance—of the common all-European process and with regard for the interests of the security of all its participants.

It is around these questions that a tense struggle has developed both at the meeting itself and in the course of the consultations which began within its framework in February 1987 of the representatives of the 23 Warsaw Pact and NATO states on questions connected with the formulation of the mandate of future negotiations on a reduction in armed forces and arms in Europe. As a result it has been possible not only to preserve but also appreciably strengthen the military-political parameters of the all-European process. The question of the Conference on Confidence-Building and Security Measures and Disarmament in Europe continuing in 1988 and negotiations on a reduction in armed forces and conventional arms on the continent starting in parallel in the event of the successful completion of the Vienna meeting has in practice been decided in advance.

There has been certain progress in the work on the mandate of the future negotiations on conventional arms conducted in the Group of 23: the general political goals of the negotiations and ways to achieve them have been preliminarily agreed. The strengthening of stability and security in Europe by way of the establishment of a balance of armed forces and conventional arms at lower levels and the elimination of inequality and also the potential for a surprise attack and the start of large-scale offensive operations is to be such a goal. The idea of mutual and appreciable reductions in military potentials has been reflected in agreed propositions. It is envisaged that the goals of the negotiations will be achieved by the application of such militarily significant measures as reductions, limitations, equal ceilings and so forth.

However, much has still to be done to bring the positions of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries closer on such key components of the mandate as the subject of the impending negotiations, the zone and verification.

The biggest difficulties are associated with the problem of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. From the very outset the USSR and the other socialist countries advocated questions of a reduction in conventional arms being tackled in a complex with tactical nuclear missiles, tactical strike aircraft, nuclear artillery and other tactical nuclear weapons, the majority of which are dual-capable weapons, that is, may carry both conventional and nuclear warheads. Subsequently the Warsaw Pact states submitted a compromise formula according to which armed forces and conventional arms, including dual-capable weapons on land, were to be the subject of the negotiations. In the course of the negotiations here the

states concerned would examine all questions pertaining to the set of problems associated with a limitation of and reduction in tactical nuclear weapons.

NATO is, as before, categorically opposed to the incorporation in the subject of the negotiations of both tactical nuclear weapons as such and dual-capable weapons, although in accordance with the classification accepted in the majority of Western countries (in Britain, Belgium and the FRG, for example) dual-capable weapons are a part of conventional arms.

Yet the need for a reduction precisely in dual-capable weapons as the most dangerous, destabilizing types of arms becomes even more paramount in connection with the conclusion of the INF Treaty and the plans being drawn up in NATO to "compensate" for the American nuclear missiles in Europe which are due to be eliminated.

Speaking in Bonn on 18 January 1988, E.A. Shevardnadze put forward a new version of a solution of the problem of tactical nuclear weapons. It is proposed starting from the future negotiations on a reduction in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe examining the question of dual-capable delivery systems (tactical missiles, heavy artillery, tactical strike aircraft and so forth). The nuclear component of such weapons itself (nuclear warheads, projectiles, aerial bombs), on the other hand, could be made the subject of corresponding negotiations in the future, this matter not being put on the back burner, however.

In not consenting to an examination in the immediate future of the question of a reduction in tactical nuclear weapons, in which, incidentally, as NATO maintains, the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries are allegedly superior, the West is once again revealing its fanatical devotion to the cliches and canons of "nuclear deterrence" strategy and the "flexible response" concept, the groundlessness of which has been shown fully in the nuclear-space era, which requires not military-power but new political thinking.

It is also of fundamental importance that the reductions in armed forces and conventional arms and the equalization (but not by way of an increase) of the existing imbalances and asymmetries in terms of their individual components be carried out on the basis of reciprocity. As M.S. Gorbachev declared at the press conference in Washington, the negotiations will be meaningful if it is a question of the reciprocal and simultaneous reduction and removal of imbalances and asymmetries. Only thus can generally acceptable solutions which do not infringe the security interests of either party or of any state be found.

The question of the content of the further work of the Conference on Confidence-Building and Security Measures and Disarmament in Europe remains pertinent and

largely unsolved. Whereas the NATO countries are putting the emphasis on a broadening of the exchange of information on the structure and deployment of armed forces and the development of the system of on-site inspection, the Warsaw Pact states are counterposing to this a broader approach corresponding to the spirit of the times (and the summary document of the Madrid meeting). It should be a question of the elaboration of confidence-building measures in respect of which consent was not reached at the Stockholm Conference or which might be advanced in the future. These are a gradual reduction in military activity, particularly of the two military alliances, notification of independent air and naval exercises, the envelopment by confidence-building measures of the territory of all participants in the All-European Conference and also other confidence-building and security measures. Measures of confidence building and military-strategic stability in Europe directly associated with a reduction in armed forces, conventional arms and military spending, which are new in nature and which would facilitate the achievement of agreements and lead to the establishment of military balance at the lowest possible level, would be a subject of study simultaneously also.

A particular feature of the all-European process is the active participation of neutral and nonaligned countries in the molding of the military-political dimension of security on the continent. Their substantial contribution to the work of the Stockholm Conference is well known. However, the stubborn attempts of the United States and its closest NATO allies to shove aside the neutrals—and these constitute one-third of the participants in the all-European process—from the discussion of questions of disarmament on the continent have been encountered at the Vienna meeting.

The Soviet Union believes that although the future negotiations will initially concern mutual reductions in the armed forces of countries which are members of military-political alliances, it is essential to provide for the possibility of the association therewith of other European states also. Real mutual linkage—both in form and in content—between the negotiations on conventional arms and the Conference on Confidence-Building and Security Measures and Disarmament in Europe is needed. This would make it possible to take account of the security interests of neutral and nonaligned states and enable them to have their say on issues concerning the future of all of Europe.

The joint statement of M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan on the results of the Washington meeting speak of the need for the completion of the work in Vienna on the mandate of the negotiations concerning a lowering of the military confrontation in Europe in the sphere of armed forces and conventional arms in order in the immediate future to begin negotiations in earnest for the purpose of the formulation of specific solutions. The importance of

the continuation and extension of the process begun by the Conference on Confidence-Building and Security Measure, and Disarmament in Europe was emphasized also.

II

A particular feature of the Vienna meeting has been the increased attention to questions of a broadening of cooperation in the field of **economics, the ecology, science and technology**. This is a kind of economic guarantee of peace and economic dimension of security. A broad understanding of the need for big new steps which will suffuse the "second basket" with content in keeping with the present demands of S&T progress and the requirements of nations' economic rapprochement has ripened.

The question of the holding after Vienna of three large-scale all-European forums on the ecology, economics and science and technology was raised. We would recall that hitherto only meetings of experts on individual aspects of the problems have been held—a scientific forum in Hamburg (1980) and two meetings on economic, scientific and cultural cooperation in the Mediterranean (1979 and 1984). Proposals which echo one another to a large extent from Czechoslovakia on an economic forum, and the FRG, on a conference on economic cooperation, initiatives from Bulgaria on an ecological forum, and from the northern countries, on a meeting on questions of ecology within the UN Economic Commission for Europe framework, Italy's idea concerning a scientific forum and Romania's proposal concerning an S&T cooperation conference have now appeared.

Discussion is now under way on the possible coupling and linkage of these proposals and, what is most important, on the content of the work of such all-European meetings. It is essential to get past the expert analysis phases and pose problems on a large scale and with a view to the future. It was in this key that Czechoslovakia submitted in October 1987 addenda to its proposal, specifying the main directions of trade and industrial cooperation and incorporating therein a number of questions contained in the FRG's proposal. Italy's initiative on the holding of a scientific forum would appear more attractive were its mandate based on a broad approach to questions of S&T cooperation.

However, future forums are a definite prospect, albeit of the next few years. It is no less important that specific arrangements advancing economic relations on an all-European scale have already been agreed in Vienna. Whereas in Belgrade and Madrid few proposals were submitted in this connection and even fewer were agreed, approximately 50 initiatives of a foreign economic nature—one-third of all those submitted at the Vienna meeting—are being discussed currently.

The formulation by many Western countries of the question of an expansion of the exchange of economic and commercial information, an improvement in businessmen's conditions of activity and the development of business contacts, including those between suppliers and consumers of imported products and medium-sized and small enterprises, for example, is natural. The socialist countries, in turn, are making the focus of attention the more efficient introduction in all-European practice of promising forms of cooperation such as joint ventures, production cooperation, industrial and S&T cooperation, compensation deals and advanced technology exchange. Unfortunately, many of these proposals are encountering the guarded and, at times, negative attitude of Western partners. The United States, for example, is once again calling in question the effectiveness of economic relations on a compensation basis and is sharply opposed to technology exchange. The prohibitive spirit of CoCom, which has long been a serious impediment to the development of mutually profitable relations with the socialist states, still prevails over many Western delegations.

Although the policy of economic sanctions and embargoes, discrimination and the arbitrary abandonment of deals and agreements which have been concluded long since revealed its groundlessness, the delegations of the United States and many of its allies are, as before, objecting to the inclusion in the summary document of the Vienna meeting of provisions aimed at the removal of obstacles and limitations in East-West trade and the elimination of artificial barriers, without which states' genuine economic security is impossible.

The abandonment of hackneyed stereotypes of thinking and action is essential for a breakthrough to be made in problems of the "second basket" as in the military-political sphere.

III

New approaches, a fresh, unblinkered view and movement toward meeting one another half-way are necessary not least in such a sphere of relations between states as the **humanitarian** sphere. After all, detente in Europe will be judged not only by the quantity of missiles withdrawn from the nuclear arsenals. The parameters of detente are also contacts between people, cooperation in the sphere of culture, information and education and basic rights and liberties of the individual. In other words, they are what constitutes the human aspect, the human dimension of the Final Act. It is in this sphere that the moral and ethical guarantees of security may be created and the potential of trust and cooperation largely realized. But it is this complicated sphere, directly associated with ideological contradictions and, it has to be admitted, already poisoned to a considerable extent by mutual mistrust, which is frequently a source of confrontation, in questions of military detente included.

Advancing in November 1986 the idea of the convening in Moscow of a representative conference on the development of humanitarian cooperation, the Soviet Union proceeded from the fact that the time was ripe for a candid businesslike East-West discussion on the entire set of these problems, a discussion oriented, what is more, toward practical results.

The Western partners, which for a long time avoided discussion of the Soviet proposal, posed the question of the plane in which discussions could proceed and requested the decoding and clarification of the idea of the conference. The addenda which the USSR submitted in July 1987 and the readiness to make the basis of the agenda a widening of humanitarian cooperation in the context of the "human dimension" of the Helsinki process markedly increased interest in the proposed forum. Confirmation of the intention to be guided in the organization of the conference by the practice and standards which had taken shape within the framework of the All-European Conference and open the plenary sessions of the conference to the press and the public met with a positive response.

The idea of the "human dimension" as applied to the all-European process may be interpreted variously. Of course, the most dependable and promising path is to remain on the firm ground of the Final Act. In other words, human rights need to be discussed in full, as recorded in principle VII of the Helsinki document. We are ready to compare the state of affairs in the field of observance of human rights with us and in the West, describe what is happening in our country and see how these problems are being tackled—and if they are being tackled—in other countries. There should be no "constricted" interpretation of the human rights problem. A serious approach presupposes an examination thereof comprehensively, including questions of political and economic lack of rights, a variety of instances of discrimination, unemployment, homelessness, hunger and so forth. After all, these questions concern not individuals but millions of people. But such a comparison is not an end in itself but rather a means, if, of course, it is not a question of confrontation. The purpose should be the encouragement and development of cooperation between states in the efficient exercise of civic, political, economic, social, cultural and other individual rights and liberties.

Or take contacts between people. Here also the Helsinki accords point in the direction not of a selective but comprehensive approach. Of course, it would be pointless to deny the need for the solution in a humane and positive spirit of such questions as, for example, the reunification of families, marriage and so forth. But is everything auspicious, for example, in the sphere of relations between establishments and organizations? Are not the barriers which are lowered from time to time in the West before union delegations, scientific figures and athletes from the socialist countries not impeding free contacts between people?

The USSR's proposal concerning the convening in Moscow of a conference on humanitarian issues has been supported by all the socialist countries and is encountering growing understanding on the part of a number of neutral and nonaligned countries and certain medium-sized and small NATO countries. However, as a whole, Western states are as yet refraining from officially setting forth their position and putting forward a variety of prior conditions, which concern both the essence of the conference's subject matter, its agenda and questions of access thereto of so-called human rights defense groups and individuals and its correlation with other all-European forums in the field of human rights and humanitarian cooperation.

Of course, the Soviet proposal does not preclude the possibility of other measures in individual areas of humanitarian problems. Thus Great Britain and also neutral countries have submitted proposals concerning the convening of an information forum, Poland, on a cultural heritage symposium, and France, on the organization in Paris in 1989 of a conference on the bicentennial of the Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the Great French Revolution.

It will be necessary in Vienna to coordinate and record in the summary document a whole number of specific steps pertaining to progress in the sphere of realization of human rights and humanitarian cooperation. However, many Western countries have yet to abandon attempts to reduce the whole set of problems to questions of entrances and exits, the reunification of families, contacts between believers and so forth. A number of their proposals in fact runs counter to the right of states recorded in the Helsinki Act to determine their own laws and administrative rules. Their realization would require, for example, legally unrestricted freedom to emigrate, cancellation of entry visas and passports, the granting of the so-called human rights defense groups the right to monitor compliance with the Helsinki accords and so forth.

At the same time, however, the West is avoiding in every possible way the assumption of commitments pertaining to the realization of man's social and economic rights and failing to adopt the socialist countries' proposals on the development of contacts between working people's mass organizations—unions and youth and women's organizations—on a reduction in the time taken to issue entry visas, guaranteed safety and normal conditions for the participants in cultural, sports and other exchanges and on an increase in the efficacy of intergovernmental agreements on these issues.

The question of negotiating the creation of a particular mechanism of states' interaction on human rights and humanitarian matters has become a central issue in Vienna. The NATO countries submitted a proposal in this connection essentially endowing such a mechanism with supranational monitoring functions. For example, they propose that any participant in the All-European

Conference be accorded the right to automatically convene the All-European Conference to examine and resolve humanitarian cases and situations in one country.

Rejecting this demand as contrary to the Final Act and infringing states' sovereignty, the socialist countries proposed instead of the monitoring mechanism the creation of a consultation and cooperation mechanism, the practical introduction of an exchange of information between the participants on human rights and humanitarian cooperation and bilateral meetings of experts to study questions of human rights and other humanitarian problems for the purpose of finding mutually acceptable ways and means of their solution in a benevolent and humane spirit, granted, of course, observance of states' sovereign rights and in conformity with their international obligations. Such practice has been taking shape and operating successfully in recent years in, for example, the USSR's relations with the United States, France, Great Britain and other countries.

For the increased efficiency of interaction in the humanitarian field the socialist states proposed that the Western countries which have yet to do so ratify the international human rights pacts and other fundamental documents in this sphere and increase their participation in UN human rights bodies.

There should be no stagnation in the humanitarian nor in other areas of the all-European process, and agreements should be sought constantly. It is necessary to view in unison and without prejudice the entire set of humanitarian problems through the prism of honest cooperation, and not confrontation.

The Vienna meeting of representatives of participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has come really close to a critical frontier—the adoption of political decisions in all areas of the further development of the all-European process and thereby the entire set of East-West relations. The fruitful conclusion of the Vienna meeting will depend on the political will and constructive actions of all participants and their desire and capacity for taking advantage of the change which has been marked in the international atmosphere by the top-level Soviet-American agreements in Washington. It is essential to continue to expand and consolidate the areas of agreement on key issues which are beginning to show through in Vienna, displaying realism and a high sense of responsibility. The Vienna meeting, to whose success the Soviet Union intends to continue actively contributing, can and should be one further good example of the fruitfulness of the new thinking in the affairs of Europe and the whole world community and in the building of the "all-European house".

Political Case for Disarmament Must have Technical Backing

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[Part two of article by A. Arbatov: "Deep Cuts in Strategic Arms"]

[Text] In connection with an analysis of the problems of the prevention of a race in space-based arms, preservation of the ABM Treaty and radical cuts in and the elimination of strategic offensive arms (SOA) the first article touched also on the procedural polemic between two schools of Soviet political scientists studying questions of disarmament and international security. It would be wrong to understand the arguments of these two schools, conditionally called "politicians" and "technocrats," as the disagreements of theorists and practitioners or as a debate of representatives of basic and applied research in this field.

The subject of the disagreements between the two concerns rather the kind of theory which is needed here, how to develop it and how closely it should be linked with practice. The "technocrats" mainly advocate the inductive method, that is, movement from the particular to the general, the revelation of regularities and the elaboration of theoretical concepts based on an analysis of practical experience in all its complexity and contradiction. They aspire to find the political "philosophers' stone" of the problems of international security by taking as the starting point an investigation of the relationship of military-technical progress and the evolution of strategic concepts; the mutual influence of strategic doctrines and international policy (primarily from the viewpoint of the danger of war); the confrontation of military programs and arms limitation talks; and, finally, closing the circle, the relationship of disarmament measures and an easing of the threat of war in states' political relations.

Representatives of the "political" school cleave for the most part to the deductive method, that is, they move from the general theory of international relations to their military and political aspects and attempt on this basis to draw conclusions with reference to specific questions of security, disarmament and the military situation.

Political Ends and Military Means

This is what E.A. Pozdnyakov, Soviet specialist in the theory of international relations field, writes, for example: "However significant the impact of weapons on policy is at times, they are nonetheless subordinate to it. Were this not so, it would be necessary to part forever not only with the hope of complete nuclear disarmament but partial arms limitation even. In fact, missiles are not created independently merely as a consequence of the simple 'logic' of the development of military technology, just as they are not deployed independently at various

points on the globe. Both are the result of states' policy, which is itself determined to a considerable extent by the political relations which have taken shape between them. This level of arms or the other is the direct consequence of the corresponding policy of states (my emphasis—A.A.) and the political relations between them. In order, consequently, to remove the effect it is necessary to begin with removal of the causes of this effect. The causes, however, are always political and cannot be anything other" (1), he concludes.

The basic propositions of the article quoted would seem perfectly justified, but the adduced statement is highly typical of the "political" school and for this reason merits more detailed analysis. The merit of the adduced syllogism is that it is absolutely uncontested, but only at a very high level of generalization. Its shortcoming, however, is the fact that a multitude of questions immediately arises upon an attempt to suffuse it with even the least specific content, not to mention to draw practical conclusions.

First of all, what is understood by states' policy, the result of which is the creation and deployment of missiles? If what is meant are diplomatic, economic and technical-strategic considerations in the process of the adoption of decisions pertaining to important military programs, everything is clear here. It is they which are the subject of the "technocrats'" research (2). If, however, what is meant are more fundamental aspects of states' political relations, their direct linkage with arms levels gives rise in a number of instances not only to theoretical objections but also leads directly to an impasse from the viewpoint of practical recommendations.

In fact, is there even one political conflict between the USSR and the United States which would justify the stockpiling of approximately 50,000 nuclear weapons and a further buildup of potentials of destruction capable not only of wiping out many times over not only these powers but also all of civilization and, possibly, life on the planet as well? Is there even one convincing explanation of the political factors in accordance with which the Warsaw Pact or NATO would decide to attack one another? But 3 million-strong groupings of the two alliances' armed forces, up to 80,000 tanks and approximately 6,000 tactical strike aircraft confront one another on the continent (3).

Another, practical, aspect of the problem is closely connected with this also. If, as the author writes, this level of arms or the other "is the direct consequence" of states' political relations, arms agreements are really not to be looked for without these relations having been changed. But inasmuch as it is generally recognized that the arms race is now in itself a most significant source of mutual distrust and contradictions between the states, changing their political relations without curbing the arms race is also barely possible. The result is a closed circle, without extrication from which not only complete

but even partial arms limitation is not really to be looked for. Given this formulation of the question, the ground for practical steps is lost, and what is left is merely a subject for interminable talk and mutual recrimination.

There is just one way out of this circle, it would seem. It must be acknowledged that although the first principle of the arms race are in fact political conflicts in states' relations, in the last 40 years the military rivalry between the biggest powers, in the nuclear arms sphere primarily, has far exceeded the political contradictions which originally engendered it and become isolated from them to a large extent. The arms race has acquired powerful inertia, formed its own, exceptionally complex reproduction mechanism and established its own regularities and cycles. What E.A. Pozdnyakov considers the transitory, temporary effect of the "reverse impact" of weapons on policy and an "optical illusion" leading to an exaggeration of the "scale and significance" of weapons (4) is precisely the key and, what is more, long-term problem of the present day.

The military sphere is not something unique here. It is sufficient to glance around to see in practically all spheres of the life of society tremendous problems born of the fact that effects become causes, and tactics, strategy and that means become an end in themselves and generate their own logic of development leaving the primordial ends far behind.

In the military sphere these regularities appear only in particular relief. The dynamics of the arms race are fed by the energy of giant military-industrial bureaucratic establishments, the powerful pulses of the S&T revolution and the constant refinement of strategic thought. Multiply this by the thick veil of secrecy which frequently conceals a lack of supervision and responsibility in the expenditure of huge resources, by jingoistic slogans covering up chauvinism and anarrowness of ideas concerning other peoples and by a fear: paralyzing rational thinking in the face of the unlimited power of destruction in the hands of other powers, against which there is no defense, and the driving momentum of this flywheel will appear on a scale closer to reality.

Its quickening revolutions not only separated long since from the original political motivations, they have even outgrown any in the least way rational military considerations (what kind of operations could be mounted in Europe, say, by almost 200 NATO and Warsaw Pact divisions were the two alliances' 7,000-8,000 tactical nuclear weapons, which would render the continent uninhabitable forever, activated?). To all appearances, the levels of military confrontation, military programs and strategic concepts have themselves become a most important, albeit highly specific, sphere and form of expression of states' political relations. This sphere is to a growing extent becoming isolated from other aspects of international policy, but entails for the latter the danger

of the most disastrous and irreparable consequences, with which no single contentious issue of present-day international life is commensurate.

But it is precisely because military-strategic reality is a particular form of expression of political relations between states that it lends itself to political influence, primarily, what is more, in a specific form of relations also: via disarmament negotiations and the corresponding agreements. And for big changes on this path it is not necessary to wait for the removal of the political first causes, the consequence of which the arms race was. The efforts and steps in the sphere of disarmament themselves, enjoying the increasingly broad support of the world community, are changing states' political relations, actively and positively influencing such an important sphere thereof as military-strategic relations.

In this respect the example adduced by E.A. Pozdnyakov involving the INF Treaty testifies, it would seem, not in support of his proposition. The treaty has, of course, abruptly changed the military-strategic relations of the USSR and the United States and the situation in Europe and Asia, and there has undoubtedly been an improvement in the overall world political situation. The treaty could not have failed to have been preceded by pronounced changes in the mood and views both in the Soviet Union and in the United States. But no political first causes of the arms race were preliminarily removed, and the other military programs continue in full swing (if anyone has evidence to the contrary, it would be interesting and gratifying to hear it).

The example of the treaty confirms precisely the other viewpoint. And it is symptomatic in this sense that this largely unprecedented agreement was signed with the R. Reagan administration—that same administration which in preceding years had done much to once again revive the "cold war," which was the first cause of the current (in terms of the composition of the participants and classes of weapons) arms race. At the same time, however, it is obvious that if in the coming years a pause in the disarmament process sets in and the fast pace that has been set is lost, an arms race will once again prevail and "make good what has been lost" even without any additional political arguments.

In order to avert such a development of events it will be necessary to solve a multitude not only of practical but also serious theoretical problems.

Problem of Strategic Stability

One such problem is the relationship of the objective military-technical possibility and the political likelihood of nuclear war. Arms reduction negotiations influence mainly the first, although agreements in this field undoubtedly improve overall political relations between states, which promotes the peaceful settlement of international conflicts, as a result of the escalation of which nuclear war could be unleashed. The connecting link

between the physical possibility and political probability of nuclear war is, it would seem, the degree of stability of the military-strategic situation.

The concept of stability or steadiness means the ease with which this object or the other may be withdrawn from the existing condition and the difficulty with which it may be returned to this condition. As pointed out in a study (5) of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Danger with reference to military-strategic balance—the principal objective factor of the prevention of nuclear war—the concept of stability must, consequently, imply the greatness of the probability and danger of a nuclear conflict being unleashed granted a given correlation of the parties' strategic weapons. More specifically, the most important aspect of stability is evidently the extent to which the constituent components of a given strategic correlation of forces increase or lessen the possibility of the delivery of a first strike in an acute crisis situation, that is, how they influence the material aspect of the danger of a thermonuclear war being unleashed.

It is wrong here, of course, to absolutize the significance of purely military factors. The political prerequisites and aims of states in a conflict have been and remain determining, and their relationship with the purely military situation has always been of a most complex dialectical nature in the plane of the danger of the growth of a crisis into war. But under present conditions the influence of military-strategic factors on the development of possible crisis situations is growing increasingly.

This has been brought about primarily by the unprecedented growth of the power of destruction, speed and range of the parties' arms and the catastrophic consequences of their use—and at the same time by the unprecedented technical and organizational complication of the military mechanisms. They are geared to preplanned and consummate interaction of a tremendous number of components and effectors coordinated in time down to minutes and seconds even and in an area encompassing land and sea and air expanses globally, and recently increasingly space also. This is making the main powers' modern armed forces, particularly their strategic nuclear "units," a powerful factor weighing on the choice of steps in a crisis situation and imposing on politicians to a growing extent a particular logic of operations with a strong admixture of strategic, operational and technical determinants.

The choice of criteria for evaluating the degree of stability of the correlation of forces as a result of this version or the other of a reduction in SOA is dictated decisively by the determination of what strategic ends the opposite side might pursue in the launching of a nuclear first strike.

According to Soviet strategic views, the most likely and priority task of nuclear aggression could be a reduction in the power of retribution, that is, prevention of a retaliatory strike or an appreciable lessening of its losses from such (6).

It should be noted that, while a permissible military goal, reducing damage in a nuclear clash could hardly be taken as a state's political goal in war. After all, the surest method of reducing any power's losses would be prevention of the unleashing of a nuclear conflict altogether. Nonetheless, a nuclear cataclysm could evidently be the continuation of a particular military strategy which has escaped subordination to policy and operates according to its own laws. Powers' political goals could clash and entail a military conflict, with the direct use against one another of conventional armed forces and arms included. It is in this situation, when both the stakes and losses in the course of the clash are already significant, that strategic logic threatens, if the leaders of the belligerents are unable to halt the escalation of combat operations and settle the conflict peacefully, to gain the ascendancy over commonsense.

As the top Soviet scientist V.I. Gantman, a father of our theory of international relations who departed this life prematurely, observed, "having arisen as a political relationship, an international conflict acquires a certain independence and logic of its own development and is itself capable of variously influencing other relationships developing in the context of the given conflict, even the nature of the contradictions at the basis thereof and the methods of their solution" (7). In an instance where a strategic nuclear attack of the other party appears inevitable or very likely and where the estimated difference in damage at the time of the first strike and a second strike is relatively great, there could be an incentive to deliver a preemptive strategic strike in the hope that the retaliatory strike would be of less power than under different conditions.

In such a situation, regardless of the states' original political motives and goals, it is the state of the strategic correlation of forces—the presence of balance or, on the contrary, the superiority of one party—which could be the decisive factor capable of tilting the balance this way or the other. The SOA talks must serve primarily the goals of a lessening of the probability of nuclear catastrophe via the consolidation of stability at declining levels of strategic balance.

Both the theoretical and practical importance of the scientific elaboration of the problems of strategic stability is obvious. And it is just as obvious that there will be no movement here without a detailed analysis of the dynamics of the military balance, strategic doctrines and concepts and the specifics of the arms reduction negotiations.

50-Percent Cuts in SOA

In the course of the top-level meeting in Washington the parties achieved a pronounced convergence of positions for the preparation of joint wording pertaining to key parameters of the first stage of SOA cuts. Specifically, the former principles of a 50-percent reduction in SOA to a level of 6,000 nuclear weapons and 1,600 delivery

systems for each party were confirmed. A limit of 154 ICBM's and 1,540 nuclear warheads on them was agreed also. A new point was the establishment of a sublevel of 4,900 ground- and sea-launched ballistic missile warheads. The joint statement also reflected agreement that as a result of the cuts the total throw-weight of the Soviet ICBM's and SLBM's would be reduced by 50 percent and that neither party would exceed this level. The rules for counting warheads on ICBM's and SLBM's were agreed. The decision to concentrate attention on the rules of counting air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) and on limiting long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) with nuclear warheads to a separate ceiling over and above the 6,000—1,600 limits. With the experience of the INF Treaty as a basis, measures for monitoring and verifying compliance with the future SOA agreement were developed considerably (8).

At the same time, however, appreciable differences between the two powers remain. The essence of the parties' disagreements on a reduction in SOA has its roots in the considerably differing approaches of the USSR and the United States to the substance of military-strategic balance and strategic stability.

The concept of strategic stability which has been made the basis of U.S. policy postulates that ground-based ICBM's are destabilizing inasmuch as they are best adapted to a first strike against the other party's strategic forces (their analogous component primarily) for the purpose of weakening them and are at the same time vulnerable to such a strike by the enemy. This allegedly creates a dual incentive for their preemptive use. But the missiles of submarines and bombers with ALCM are allegedly intended only for a retaliatory attack (the first are insufficiently accurate and have unreliable communications with the center, and the second require a time of many hours of approach to target). Consequently, the more strictly ICBM's are reduced and limited, the less the likelihood of a first strike and the higher strategic stability.

Taking its understanding of stability as the basis, the United States is endeavoring to obtain terms of the agreement which would alter the structure, qualitative composition and, consequently, operational possibilities of the Soviet Union's strategic forces. Defining ground-based ICBM as the most "destabilizing" type of strategic weapon, the American side has since the Reykjavik meeting been insisting on the incorporation in a treaty of sublevels additionally limiting the number of warheads on individual components of the strategic triad (ICBM's plus SLBM's in toto and ICBM's separately) and even on certain types of ground-based ballistic missiles. These conditions presuppose an appreciable reconfiguration of the traditional composition of the Soviet strategic forces conditioned by the specific features of the geostrategic location, organizational-technical development and history of the development of the military doctrine and strategy of the Soviet Union.

Besides the quantitative sublevels, strict qualitative limitations should, in accordance with the American proposals, be imposed on heavy ICBM's—traditionally the key component of Soviet SOA—inasmuch as it would be forbidden to manufacture, test or deploy modernized types thereof and modify or refit their launchers. A condition concerning the banning and dismantling of ground-mobile ICBM's was offered also. It was aimed at one stroke against two Soviet programs: it is a question of the RS-22 (SS-24) ICBM system with multiple reentry vehicles (MRV's) and of the RS-12M (SS-25)-type modernized single-warhead ICBM (9). The Soviet Union would thereby be deprived of the possibility of the enhanced survivability of its strategic missile forces (SMF) in the face of the deployment of new American systems (MX, Trident 2, cruise missiles) with high kill capability in respect of hardened permanent facilities of the ICBM launch silo type.

The American condition concerning a ban on mobile ICBM's is officially justified by difficulties of verification, specifically of the prohibition on the capacity for the rapid reloading of ICBM launchers. It is obvious, however, that perfectly dependable safeguards against the possibility of ground-mobile missile launcher reloading could be secured given the all-embracing verification measures, including on-site inspection, being discussed currently by the two powers. It is indicative that this point of the official American position has evoked serious criticism both on the part of the "strategic community" in the United States, including its conservative representatives, and in Congress.

A directly opposite attitude toward verification is demonstrated by the administration when it is a matter of American military programs. The United States is by no means urging restrictions on long-range SLCM's, despite the mutual understanding in principle reached in respect of them in Reykjavik. Yet SLCM's are a clearly expressed destabilizing weapons system. They possess increased accuracy and the capacity for destroying highly protected targets, and it is hard to fix their launch and approach with space- and ground-based early warning facilities, which creates a threat both to the strategic forces of the other party and its control and communications system.

The United States is planning to deploy approximately 4,000 Tomahawk-class SLCM's in 10 various modifications with nuclear and conventional warheads on multipurpose Los Angeles and Sturgeon-class nuclear submarines (altogether, 93 nuclear submarines by the mid-1990's) and also on large missile-firing ships of the "New Jersey," "Virginia," "California," "Ticonderoga" and "Berk" class (approximately 100 existing and programmed ships as a whole). It is significant that the verification problem is no trouble for the U.S. Administration in this case, and it is refusing to discuss limitations on SLCM's, aside from one class thereof with a nuclear warhead, although distinguishing individual versions of this system by outward characteristics is practically impossible.

One circumstance of a general nature has to be mentioned. Even without any sublevels and qualitative limitations a 50-percent reduction in SOA to ceilings of 6,000 nuclear weapons and 1,600 delivery systems would affect the strategic forces and programs of the Soviet Union more appreciably. The point being that, first, the United States has a more balanced allocation of delivery systems and nuclear weapons in the three components of the strategic triad. Second, in the arms race the USSR has mainly responded to the actions of the United States with a 5-year gap on average in system-deployment phases. In the Soviet strategic forces there are more single-warhead delivery vehicles than in the American forces. In 1987 single-warhead missiles and bombers without ALCM's constituted for the USSR 49 percent of delivery systems, but for the United States, 41 percent (10). At the same time, however, the Soviet multiple-warhead ICBM's, SLBM's and heavy bombers (with cruise missiles) are approximately 5-7 years "younger" than the American ones, and the most costly operational units (in model-cost terms)—missile-firing nuclear submarines with missiles with MRV's—have a lesser "age" compared with their American counterparts by 15 years on average.

This means that the Soviet Union would have to effect the 50-percent reduction in respect of far less obsolete systems, in respect of submarines particularly. The removal, on the other hand, of the comparatively old single-warhead missiles and aircraft produces a substantial reduction in terms of delivery systems (more than 50 percent), but a very slight reduction in terms of warheads (13 percent). The United States could theoretically thanks to obsolete single-warhead and multiple-warhead delivery systems and old submarines reduce its SOA more painlessly 60 percent in terms of delivery systems and 65 percent in terms of warheads (per the counting rules) (11). This would provide for the 50-percent reduction and additionally create a certain "reserve" for the deployment of new-generation strategic systems.

As already mentioned, a compromise sublevel on the sum total of ICBM and SLBM warheads of 4,900 was fixed at the Washington meeting. Knowing the counting rules (12), it is not difficult to reckon that, given the deployment of, say, up to 3,300 warheads on ICBM's, the Soviet Union could have a maximum of 1,600 warheads on SLBM's, that is, 5 Typhoon-class submarines with SS-N-20 missiles and 9-10 submarines with SS-N-23 SLBM's (as an alternative, only 8 Typhoon SSBN's or some combination based on 3 submarines of the second class in place of one Typhoon-class missile-firing submarine).

In any version the Soviet Union would have to withdraw from the SOA more than 50 missile-firing submarines, including some relatively new SSBN's which left the building slips in the 1970's and also no less than 500 old single-warhead SS-11 and SS-13 ICBM's (RS-12 in the

Soviet classification) and more than 400 SS-17, SS-19 and SS-18 MRV missiles (designated RS-16, RS-18 and RS-20 in the USSR) commissioned since 1975 (13).

As far as the United States' strategic forces are concerned, they would, by virtue of the said objective circumstances, be affected somewhat more "sparingly". Given the withdrawal of 28 obsolete Poseidon and Trident 1 submarines with SLBM's (built in the period 1962-1967), 260 old B-52 bombers (manufactured at the end of the 1950's-start of the 1960's) and 770 Minuteman 2 and Minuteman 3 ICBM's (1965-1975), it would be relatively less difficult for the United States to refit its SOA for the latest systems. As a possible route within the framework of the said sublevels, it would have an opportunity to deploy, for example, 17 Ohio-class submarines with Trident 2 SLBM's, 50-80 B-1B heavy bombers with cruise missiles (14) and 130 breakthrough-type Stealth bombers and also 100 new MX ICBM's, retaining here approximately 180 Minuteman 3 missiles with the new MK-12A warheads (as an alternative, having built 50 MX missiles, it would be possible to retain all 300 Minuteman 3 ICBM's of this modification or have 180 of them and additionally deploy 500 new mobile Midgetman missiles).

"What's the point of all these bewildering calculations?" some supporters of the "political" school ask. "After all, it is the political meaning of the reduction in the arsenals of destruction which is far more important." Yes, this is undoubtedly the case, the treaty would improve Soviet-American relations and the entire political climate in the world. But what does this amount to if the question is posed more specifically? How are the positive changes measured, how are the possible negative phenomena weighed and how are they removed? The main political essence of the treaty is obviously the fact that, thanks to it, there is to be a diminution in the threat of nuclear war. But more tangible and stable changes than the good mood of the world community (which also, of course, performs not the least role) are needed for this. These changes must be expressed in a lessening of the material possibility and, consequently, all other things being equal, the political probability of a nuclear first strike in a hypothetical crisis situation, which could actually trigger a nuclear war. And general discussion is not enough here. It is necessary to count and analyze and formulate justified concepts of what strategic ends the enemy may be pursuing in launching a first strike, which factors of the military balance contribute to this and which impede it and how their correlation may be changed as a result of this treaty draft or the other.

The sublevels and other limitations proposed by Washington are based, as observed earlier, on a concept of "strategic stability" which has been worked up in detail. This concept has taken shape and been extensively discussed in the United States over two decades in circles of specialists, politicians and representatives of the mass media. Although the concept is not monolithic and has a number of differing versions in the United States, its

common propositions substantiate both American policy at the negotiations and its strategic programs as complementary components of the single policy of "safeguarding security".

In practice it has many weak points and has been seriously criticized in Soviet scientific literature (15). But inasmuch as the strengthening of strategic stability occupies such an important place in the negotiations of the USSR and the United States, the Soviet approach to this question is obviously in need of more detailed and comprehensive elucidation in the context of disclosure of the USSR's defensive military doctrine. After all, at the current stage, while nuclear weapons have not yet been eliminated, both the USSR Armed Forces and its policy of reaching radical disarmament accords serve the common goal of preventing nuclear war.

Where it has not been possible as yet to come to an agreement it is necessary to maintain the balance thanks to military programs providing for deterrence by their retaliatory strike potential. It is expedient measuring this deterrence in accordance with the principle of reasonable sufficiency with regard for the forces and programs of the other side. But where the forces of the United States may be limited by way of agreements, the need for certain nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union, renunciation of which could be a part of these agreements, is removed. Attaching priority precisely to this path is prescribed by the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, which made paramount political methods of strengthening security. Addressing the UN General Assembly 42d Session, V.F. Petrovskiy, deputy USSR foreign minister, emphasized: "We proceed from the fact that progress toward a nuclear-free world may be made in stages both in terms of the composition of the participants and the inclusion of arms, and at each stage, what is more, and throughout this process security should be strengthened constantly and strategic stability enhanced. Agreement should be reached at the intermediate stages of this progress at least on a reasonable sufficiency of arms, both nuclear and conventional, and on preservation of strategic stability at the lowest possible level of this sufficiency" (16).

A comprehensive elucidation of the Soviet concept of stability would show convincingly how our strategy of the prevention of war and an orientation exclusively toward a retaliatory strike predetermines the existing and future structure and the basic quantitative and qualitative specifications of the Soviet SOA.

Greater *glasnost* in these matters cannot weaken security. After all, the main thing in Soviet military doctrine (and, consequently, strategy, operational art and military organizational development) is preventing nuclear war, and not "surprising" the enemy if he, for all that, ventures an attack. Of course, in a number of aspects a degree of military uncertainty reduces the likelihood of aggression. Specific details of operational planning and the functioning of the control, communications and

warning system should, of course, be kept secret (and, incidentally, kept secret not only by the Soviet Union but America also) lest the other party attempt to avail itself of such information to acquire the capacity for a "decapitating" or "disarming" strike. But uncertainty proves completely counterproductive when it is used by the other party to develop a campaign about the "Soviet threat," to justify new rounds of the arms race and for attempts to impose unequal terms of agreements on the Soviet Union.

The political approach to safeguarding security presupposes big reductions in arms, both old and new. The "politician" scientists rightly point out that the impending withdrawal of submarines, missiles and aircraft is not to be regretted—it is, after all, the actual disarmament process. But the stability of the strategic balance must not be shaken in the course of this process.

Inasmuch as the sublevels being discussed currently would, as shown above, perceptibly limit the numbers of Soviet ICBM's, SLBM's and the submarines themselves, we cannot, naturally, be indifferent to what new systems the United States will deploy in the 1980's-1990's within the framework of the agreed overall ceilings and sublevels. A reduction in SOA by half should lead to a strengthening of stability and a limitation of the counterforce potential of the United States (primarily its capacity for destroying protected targets and hitting ground-mobile missile deployment areas). The establishment of certain supplementary sublevels or structural quotas for the strategic forces remaining following the cuts could contribute to this.

For example, it is a question of limits on individual arms systems within each component of the strategic triad. The Washington meeting, we recall, agreed a limit of 1,540 warheads for heavy ICBM's within a sublevel of 4,900 warheads on ground- and sea-launched ballistic missiles. The establishment of special limits also within the sea- and air-launched components of SOA in order to limit the deployment of destabilizing systems would, it would seem, contribute to stability in this connection. This applies to the Trident 2-class new SLBM's (together, of course, with their technical counterparts in the USSR). Then instead of on 17, the United States could deploy the Trident 2 missiles on a lesser number of Ohio-class submarines, and there would, correspondingly, be a reduction in the number of powerful and accurate counterforce weapons undermining stability and increasing the threat of a first strike.

As far as ALCM's are concerned, the sublevel of 4,900 warheads (out of 6,000) on ICBM's and SLBM's presupposes the limitation of ALCM's to 1,100. In insisting on a larger quantity thereof the United States is thereby eroding the significance of the subceiling of 4,900. After all, the other party also could propose a raising thereof within the overall framework in order to augment the number of highly viable retaliatory strike weapons in other components of the strategic triad. Inasmuch as the

United States is insisting on limiting ICBM warheads to a sublevel of 3,300 (in October 1987 the USSR proposed a version of such a limit of 3,000-3,300), it would surely be useful converting this subceiling into a limit of the concentration of warheads in any one component of the triad (that is, 50-55 percent), both ground and sea and air.

As pointed out above, the American conditions of a 50-percent reduction presuppose a considerable change in the traditional structure of Soviet SOA. The question arises in this connection: is this structure in some way sacramental brooking no change. Obviously, this is not the case: we have recently been witnessing how many traditions which had seemed permanent have been undergoing revision to the benefit of the cause. Indeed, incidentally, the structure of Soviet SOA has historically changed very noticeably. For example, prior to 1967 the USSR had no SSBN's, which are counted by specialists of both parties in the effective combat strength of the SOA; at the time of the signing of SALT I (1972) the proportion of sea-launched missiles in terms of warheads constituted approximately 20 percent, but in 1986, more than 30 percent (17). The proportion of nuclear weapons of heavy bombers, which now constitutes approximately 5 percent, will increase (in accordance with the sublevel of 4,900 recorded in Washington) to almost 20 percent if the USSR's total number of nuclear weapons following the 50-percent cuts is no less than the agreed 6,000.

Thus it is not a question of the permanency of the structure as such but of the USSR's strategic forces being optimally adapted within the limits of a reduction in SOA by half for performance of their main assignment: prevention of a nuclear attack with impunity, based on their readiness to deliver a retaliatory attack capable of causing the aggressor unacceptable damage (18). The principle of reasonable sufficiency, however, by no means presupposes a restructuring of SOA per the American model, toward which we are being pushed by its terms of reductions. On the contrary, the said principle precludes this rather: after all, the structure and specifications of the United States' forces embody certain strategic concepts which are unacceptable to us ("countervailing disarming strike," "limited and protracted nuclear war" and others). The neutralization of these plans presupposes not the preparation of analogous plans and arms but preservation of the capacity for performing the above-mentioned assignment in spite of the new strategic weapons of the United States. In addition, there are objective differences in the parties' geostrategic position and their technical development.

Abiding by the principle of safeguarding security politically, even more far-reaching measures in a subsequent reduction in SOA could be proposed. For example, limiting to special individual sublevels the number of warheads on the systems which the parties consider for each other destabilizing and the most dangerous. These subceilings would encompass on the American side the MX, Trident 2 and ALCM systems, on the Soviet side,

analogous weapons plus heavy missiles. In this case dangerous new American arms would, together with a reduction in and limitation of a number of Soviet systems, be limited appreciably—with considerable benefit to the stability and security of both parties.

Even more radical steps, particularly in the light of the USSR's intention not to stop at 50-percent cuts, are possible also. There is no point postponing these steps for long, after all, in the next 5-7 years the deployment of new systems even within the lowered quantitative ceilings could cost a tremendous amount of money, and this in itself would make more difficult subsequent, even deeper cuts, not to mention the possible destabilizing effect of a new generation of arms. The Soviet scientist A.A. Kokoshin advanced in this connection an important theoretical proposition which is being fully corroborated by practice: "In contrast to efforts to restore and maintain military-strategic parity," he emphasized, "the strengthening of strategic stability unilaterally is a far more difficult business and at times almost impossible. Whence an important feature of stability—the need for reciprocity to safeguard it" (that is, the corresponding agreements—A.A.) (19).

Proceeding from considerations of the enhanced survivability of SOA, a ban on ground-mobile ICBM's (20) in the course of a reduction in strategic arms, given adequate opportunities for verification, is entirely unwarranted. Of course, SLCM's, as a most destabilizing type of strategic arms, should be limited. If the United States is prepared to discuss a limitation only of SLCM's with nuclear warheads, it must itself also assist in ensuring reliable verification involving the use of new technical facilities and also on-site inspection. It puts the issue precisely thus in respect of ground-mobile ICBM's and other Soviet systems. If verification measures and military programs are in conflict, the second, and not the first, should be sacrificed for the sake of the conclusion of more radical agreements. A political approach to safeguarding security based on a comprehensive analysis of both strategic and technical issues must be displayed here also.

An analysis of the problems of deep cuts in strategic arms makes it possible to draw certain preliminary conclusions of a procedural nature also. The argument between the "politicians" and "technocrats" (the latter-day "lyric poets" and "physicists") is more often than not devoid of real grounds. It is brought about for the most part not by different approaches to the problem but reflects the endeavor of some people to avoid a systematic study of extremely complex military-strategic subject matter (which does not fit fully within the traditional framework of the humanities) and the readiness of others to undertake this painstaking and endless labor, beginning at times right at the beginning. However, life and work settle these arguments quite definitely. When all ("lyrical," so to speak) words have been spoken and it is necessary to switch to actual deeds, nothing can substitute for the professional and detailed investigation of military-strategic problems.

That the problems of security, and more narrowly even—disarmament subject matter as an aspect thereof—are far from exhausted by study of military-strategic and military-technical questions is another matter. They encompass a wide range of international policy, domestic policy, economic and social and psychological subjects. For example, an evaluation of the prospects of a 50-percent reduction in SOA cannot be reduced merely to the military-strategic, technical and negotiating-legal aspects of the question. An analysis of the domestic political situation of the United States (including the results of the INF Treaty ratification process), the economic situation and the overall development of Soviet-American relations and the two powers' relations with their allies, which are reflected in the Geneva negotiations, is absolutely essential here. All these subjects require special study and have for this reason not been touched on in this article. Here it is up to the specialists in the corresponding fields. But this also is, obviously, something entirely specific and completely different from abstract arguments in support of disarmament.

Generally, we may express the opinion that disarmament problems are a specific, entirely independent, new branch of science. They stand at the intersection of the natural and exact sciences, political and economic studies, military science and art and history and psychology. They are directly coupled with practice in the form of diplomatic negotiations, are nurtured constantly by their experience and deduce therefrom generalizations and regularities which should serve as the basis for specific forecasts and recommendations. This science constantly undergoes strict verification by practice. And, like any true science, it does not tolerate verbiage, slipshod formulas or premature ideas and takes vengeance for arbitrary treatment of itself.

The so-called "technocrats," for their part, must not, of course, become real technocrats in the negative meaning of this word. Weapons systems, strategic concepts, methods of evaluating the military balance, arms reduction levels and sublevels—all this, of course, is not an end in itself but merely the means of realization and form of expression of policy strengthening or, on the contrary, undermining security. This subordination cannot be lost sight of particularly now, when the new philosophy of security presupposes a fresh view of the world, a view "without spectacles and blinders," and a quest for bold, nontraditional ways of reining in the nuclear danger.

"Politician" scientists appealing against a preoccupation with "pieces of iron" and for people to rise above prosaic details are by no means helping the development of the scientific base in this field, in which, let's face it, for objective and subjective reasons, there is as yet far broader scope for development than in the majority of other fields of the political and economic sciences. Thinking that they are contributing to the political approach, the "lyric poets" are in fact, despite themselves, strengthening the truly technocratic viewpoint.

The former's representatives do not, naturally, in scientific debate take any of this "lyric poetry" at all seriously, but frequently fail to greet the viewpoint with a concretized alternative either. Streamlined, glowing maxims not suffused with objective content frequently burst like soap bubbles when confronted with the sharp edges of military-strategic reality and negotiating practice. The political approach may be extolled as much as you like, but this remains merely melodious rhetoric as long as this approach is not expressed via levels of a reduction in arms, conditions of their qualitative limitations and alternatives to the evolution of the military balance and strategic concepts. And then this approach needs to be further substantiated and defended in scientific argument within and with foreign specialists.

It is such responsible judgments which practice now obviously expects of science. As the splendid Russian historian V.O. Klyuchevskiy wrote, "the value of any knowledge is determined by its connection with our needs, aspirations and conduct; otherwise knowledge becomes simple memory ballast good for lessening the day-to-day rolling of, perhaps, an empty ship which is sailing without really valuable cargo" (21).

Footnotes

1. MEMO No 10, 1987, pp 31-32.
2. Very popular among these, incidentally, are so-called "case studies," that is, an examination of the process of the adoption of decisions in respect of major military programs in an aggregate of all the factors influencing it, including interdepartmental struggle.
3. See "Disarmament and Security 1986". Yearbook, vol 1, pp 191, 220.
4. MEMO No 10, 1987, p 31.
5. See "Strategic Stability Under the Conditions of Radical Reductions in Nuclear Arms" (Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace, Against the Nuclear Danger), Moscow, 1987.
6. D.F. Ustinov, "Warding Off the Threat of Nuclear War" (PRAVDA, 12 July 1982). "For Peace on Earth. Soviet Program for the 1980's in Action". Articles and documents, Moscow, 1983, p 184.
7. "International Conflicts of the Present Day" (Exec. ed. V.I. Gantman), Moscow, 1983, p 18.
8. See PRAVDA, 12 December 1987.
9. "Disarmament and Security 1986". Yearbook, vol 1, p 26.
10. PRAVDA, 8 February 1988.
11. Ibid., 17 March 1987.

12. Ibid., 12 December 1987.
13. Estimated from PRAVDA, 12 December 1987; PRAVDA, 8 February 1988; "Whence the Threat to Peace," Moscow, 1982, pp 7-8.
14. Depending on what counting rules are agreed, that is, how many ALCM's are counted on each heavy bomber, the number of bombers could be even larger.
15. See "Strategic Stability Under the Conditions of Radical Reductions in Nuclear Arms," Moscow, 1987; A.G. Arbatov, A.A. Vasilyev, A.A. Kokoshin, "Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Stability" (SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA Nos 9, 10, 1987).
16. VESTNIK MID SSSR No 9, 10 December 1987, pp 10-11.
17. Estimated from "Whence the Threat to Peace," Moscow, 1987, p 8; "Disarmament and Security 1986" Yearbook, vol 1, p 39.
18. See D.T. Yazov, "On Guard of Socialism and Peace," Moscow, 1987, p 34.
19. A.G. Arbatov, A.A. Vasilyev, A.A. Kokoshin, "Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Stability" (article 1) (SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA No 9, 1987, p 10).
20. The mobility of the launch sites makes the targeting thereon of the other side's weapons employing inertial guidance systems and programmed flight control more difficult owing to the uncertainty of location of the target, in this case, the ICBM launcher.
21. V.O. Klyuchevskiy, "Course of Russian History," "Werks," vol 1, Moscow, 1987, p 60.

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U.S. Spending Has Greater Psychological Than Military Impact

18160009e Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 88 pp 43-56

[Article by Aleksey Alekseyevich Vasilyev, candidate of technical sciences, head of the USSR Academy of Sciences Historical Commission, and Mikhail Ivanovich Gerasev, candidate of historical sciences, senior scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Historical Commission: "Certain Results of the R. Reagan Administration's Military-Political Course"]

[Text] Operating under the slogan of the achievement of military superiority, throughout the 1980s the R. Reagan

administration has made purposive efforts for a rapid quantitative buildup and qualitative upgrading of the American armed forces. At the same time, despite the growth of U.S. military power which has occurred in this time, the administration is today coming in for quite keen criticism pointing to essential flaws in its military-political course. What is the normality and stability of the trends which led the U.S. leadership to broaden the Soviet-American dialogue on disarmament, sign the INF Treaty and agree in principle to a 50-percent reduction in SOA, given compliance with the ABM Treaty? An answer to these questions is impossible without a comprehensive analysis of the results of Washington's policy in the military-political sphere.

The end of the 1970s was a difficult stage for American foreign policy. The chain of telling setbacks and the inconsistency and contradictoriness of the policy of the Democratic administration brought with them calls for an urgent reassessment of the basic postulates of the United States' foreign policy and its adaptation to the changing international situation. The prescription for such a reconsideration proposed in the course of the 1980 election campaign by the representatives of the right wing of the Republican Party and their candidate, R. Reagan, was based on a most simplistic, bipolar vision of the modern world and provided for a maximum enhancement of the value of the military factor in U.S. foreign policy. It was essentially a question not of adjustments to the United States' line of behavior on the international scene in accordance with the foreign policy situation which had taken shape but of the power transformation of existing realities and their adaptation to the ideas of the United States' global domination. In the opinion of Reagan and those closest to him, all the United States' foreign and military-political problems which had arisen at the end of the 1970s were the direct consequence of the insufficient backing for American policy of real military power.

The natural consequence of such assessments was the Reagan administration's sharp criticism of the military-political course of its predecessors and also the proclamation of a commitment "to restore the United States' military superiority" lost as a result "of the systematic neglect of national security interests in the 1970s." At the same time, it would seem, the critical rhetoric bore the marked imprint of deliberate exaggerations and biased evaluations of the actual state of the American armed forces.

In terms of the majority of basic indicators it was hard to call the 1970's as a whole, as also the J. Carter presidency in particular, a decade of the "neglect of the United States' national security interests". Despite a certain reduction in the growth rate of the military budget in the 1970s brought about by the end to the war in Vietnam, as a result of the ballistic missiles being fitted with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's) the number of nuclear weapons of the United States' strategic forces more than doubled in this period (from 4,000 in 1970 to 9,000 in 1980). A set of modernization

programs, which affected all components of the U.S. nuclear triad, was begun in the 1970s. In the conventional arms sphere the reduction in the rate of purchases of new military hardware which was observed was objectively caused by the round of accelerated modernization which had taken place at the start of the decade associated with the Vietnam war. But even the certain dropoff which followed it in the mid-1970s was brief, and as of 1976 even expenditure on weapons purchase items in the U.S. military budget had begun to grow quite rapidly in real terms. Programs for the creation of a new tank, armored personnel carrier, helicopter and two new fighters—the F-15 and F-16—entered the series production phase in this period. The U.S. Army was increased from 13 to 16 divisions (which partly gave rise to the problem of a personnel shortage), and the program of a buildup of the numbers of tactical aircraft from 22 to 26 air wings was begun also.

Only the navy actually reduced its strength in the 1970s as a consequence of the withdrawal of ships which had reached the end of their service life. But contracts were then drawn up for the construction of new warships, which were to enter active service under the subsequent administration.

None of these real indicators was taken into consideration by critics of the Carter administration. Their sharp rhetoric was based not so much on an objective analysis of the state of the American armed forces; it reflected more a desire to profit from the psychological sense, supported by representatives of far right circles, of "American weakness" characteristic of the mass mood in the United States at the end of the 1970s. It was for this reason that the main motive for the criticism came to be the most general indicator—the military budget—which was declared "chronically insufficient in the 1970s". Such an approach to military-political problems through the prism of the military budget proved effective from the viewpoint of its impact on the electorate. Speculating on this issue, the Republicans succeeded in putting together a relatively broad consensus concerning the need for an increase in military spending. By the end of 1980, according to the results of an opinion poll, more than 60 percent of Americans supported increased appropriations for military needs, and only 7 percent advocated a reduction therein.

The political pressure was so significant that it could not be ignored by the outgoing Democratic administration either. On leaving the Pentagon Defense Secretary H. Brown maintained in his final report to Congress that total Soviet spending from 1968 through 1979 had been \$270 billion more than American spending and that "the balance of spending today will show up as the military balance of tomorrow" (1). The latest "gap" between the United States and the Soviet Union—in the military spending sphere this time—was thereby given a base.

The presidential election victory confronted the Reagan administration with the need to clothe its slogans in specific military-political measures. It transpired here

that the "luggage" with which the new leadership had entered the White House contained practically no fundamentally new ideas. The plans for practical steps to change the existing military balance in favor of the United States which had been prepared by the administration's advisers, among which the most prominent place was occupied by the program for a buildup of strategic forces (the so-called "quick fix list"), confronted the new leadership basically with tasks of expanding, accelerating and, in some cases, modernizing military programs which had already been drawn up.

In addition, following the new administration's presentation of specific detailed plans in the military sphere, primarily the program for modernization of the United States's strategic forces of 2 October 1981, it became obvious that even these proposals of experts of a conservative-right persuasion had undergone very considerable cuts. As a whole, the program was far closer to the plans of the Carter administration than to the "quick fixes" and was even inferior to the Democrats' plan in terms of certain other parameters.

There was a marked lowering also of the Reagan administration's ambitions in the sphere of development of the general forces. The first report of Republican Defense Secretary C. Weinberger for the 1983 fiscal year even contained a warning that the pace of modernization of the general forces would be less than the administration would wish and advanced as the main goal the achievement of greater efficiency of the manufacture of military equipment and a strengthening of the corresponding industrial base (2).

It is necessary to bear in mind in evaluating this transformation the exceptionally propitious domestic political situation in which the administration found itself following the 1980 election victory. The Democrats were demoralized as a result of the defeat, and the administration was faced with practically no organized and influential opposition which might have counterposed to its military policy some telling arguments. Under these conditions it could perfectly well have anticipated approval of the most radical ideas in the field of military development. But the administration had no such ideas.

As a result the most visible component of Reagan's military program remained a sharp increase in the military budget. It is sufficient to say that without a detailed study of the military budget request which had been made by its predecessor the Republican administration was in less than 2 weeks after having taken office requesting an additional \$26 billion for the 1982 fiscal year (3). The average annual growth of the military budget in the first 4 years (fiscal years 1982-1985) in comparable prices amounted to 8 percent (2.9 percent in fiscal years 1978-1980). The proportion of military spending in the GNP grew from 5.5 percent in the 1981 fiscal year to 6.6 percent in the 1985 fiscal year, and in the federal budget, from 23.2 to 26.5 percent respectively (4).

This growth was accompanied by internal structural reorganization of the military budget. The administration took the route of preferential development of the "investment" items (R&D and arms purchases), which accounted for more than 60 percent of the entire increase in the military budget in the period from fiscal years 1981 through 1987. The "support" items, usually connected with maintaining the combat readiness of the armed forces (pay and the maintenance and operation of materiel), accounted in this same period for 29 percent of the additional appropriations (5). In absolute terms expenditure in the said period on the investment items grew 75 percent and amounted to 43 percent of the U.S. military budget.

Thus having been able to achieve a reallocation of resources from civil to military needs unprecedented for peacetime, the Reagan administration simultaneously shifted the internal priorities of the military budget in favor of the preferential financing of programs of an increase in the quantity and quality of arms. This policy could not, undoubtedly, have failed to have led to a growth of U.S. military power. The main question was whether this growth was in keeping with the financial investments in the military sphere.

Development of Strategic Nuclear Forces

We would note at once that in no sphere has the Reagan administration changed the balance in its favor. Having declared that the vulnerability of America's strategic forces and at the same time the danger of an attack on the part of the USSR would be at their maximum by 1985, the United States has spent on the development of its strategic forces more than 25 percent of the entire increase in military appropriations in the 1980s. At the same time there has in this period been a decline in the number of strategic delivery systems (see Table 1), and the United States' advantage in terms of the numbers of nuclear warheads of the strategic forces has diminished thus:

Table 1. U.S. Strategic Forces in 1980 and 1987

Component of strategic forces	1980	1987	% change
Bombers (B-52's, B-1B's)	316	292	-8
ICBM's	1,052	1,000	-5
SLBM's	576	528	-8
Total delivery systems	1,944	1,820	-6

Source: "American Defense Annual 1987-1988". Edited

Of the five main components of modernization of the strategic triad, three—MX, Trident and Stealth—were a continuation of plans adopted in the 1970s, the fourth—the B-1B—revived a program which had been canceled by Carter and the fifth—the Midgetman mobile ICBM—emerged to a considerable extent as a consequence of the

domestic political struggle and was an administration concession in exchange for congressional support for the MX program. Of course, it would be wrong, taking merely quantitative indicators as a basis, to speak of a weakening of the U.S. strategic forces. It was only old arms which were written off. Given the simultaneous increase in efforts to create new generations thereof, this meant a shift of emphasis to qualitative parameters of the arms race.

Even in the abridged form compared with the preelection plans the program for the modernization of the strategic forces has not developed as successfully as the administration hoped. Problems which have arisen in the course of the development and deployment of a whole number of most important strategic programs (the B-1B, MX, Stealth, C³I) have now become public property.

The Reagan administration's incapacity for making appreciable amendments to the plans for the development of the strategic nuclear forces was caused to a considerable extent by its lack of fundamental new principles in this field. It ultimately took the route pioneered by its predecessors. By 1982 even it had practically abandoned attempts to elaborate its own strategic concept and subscribed to the policy proposed by the Carter leadership. It was a question of preservation of the concept set forth in the well-known PD-59. In 1982 C. Weinberger confirmed (with negligible amendments) adherence to the concept formulated by the preceding administration (6).

Thus the activity of the new leadership made no fundamental changes to the arterial directions of military thought and the development trends of the strategic triad established in the 1970s. It played on the fact that it was in its term in office that the majority of the main military programs either entered the production and deployment phase or were very close to this. As a result the key long-term trend of the development of the United States' strategic forces established in its basic parameters back in the 1970s has become more visible. It is a question primarily of the preferential increase in the capacity for destroying centers of political and military leadership and ICBM launcher silos constituting the basis of the USSR's strategic forces. The administration's hope of molding in a certain part of public opinion both in the United States itself and among its allies the idea that time, technology and the asymmetry in the structure of the sides' strategic forces were working to the United States' advantage was evidently based on this circumstance also.

General Forces

The administration has increased the number of combat-ready army divisions from 16 to 18, implemented the decision to increase the number of tactical air wings to 26 and come very close to the goal of creating a navy of

600 warships and 14 carrier groups. It has also succeeded in resolving the armed forces' personnel problems and achieving a pronounced growth in the proportion therein of personnel of the appropriate standard of education.

When evaluating these results, other circumstances should be taken into consideration also. The two additional light army divisions were brought up to strength thanks to personnel of existing army subunits. The increase in tactical aviation strength, just as the growth in the number of warships, was provided for by decisions of the preceding administration. As far as the vaunted successes in the solution of the armed forces' recruitment problem are concerned, the decisive role here has been performed by the sharp (up to 55 percent on average compared with 1980) (7) increase in the various forms of servicemen's pay. The opinion has been expressed here that the task could have been tackled more economically thanks to a selective increase in the income of individual categories of military personnel.

One further result of the Reagan administration's policy in the sphere of development of the general forces has been the increase in purchases of military equipment compared with the end of the 1970s period. All told, the number of units of military hardware (aircraft, tanks, missiles and so forth) purchased in the period 1982 through 1985 exceeded the 1978-1981 level 26 percent, but at the same time was considerably inferior to the 1974-1977 period, when the armed forces obtained 54 percent more units of military hardware (8).

The quantitative increase in military equipment purchases in the period of the Reagan administration has been far from unambiguous. When the Carter administration left the White House, it was pursued by accusations that the acquisition of 227 fighters a year was the "danger line" below which came "neglect of national security interests". However, in the period 1982-1985 the Pentagon acquired an average of 172 fighters a year (22 percent fewer) (9).

The growth in arms purchases in the 1980's has been accompanied by an even bigger growth in the cost thereof. Upon a comparison of the statistics of the period of the most rapid growth of the military budget (fiscal years 1982-1985) with the 4 years of the Carter administration it can be seen that the appropriations for military aircraft grew 75.4 percent, but the number of machines ordered, 8.8 percent. In purchases of all classes of missiles these figures appear as an increase in appropriations of 91.2 percent and a growth of purchases of 6.4 percent. The growth of appropriations for purchases of tanks and helicopters in the 1980s has amounted to almost 150 percent, whereas the pool of machines has increased 30 and 40 percent respectively (10).

Administration spokesmen explain this trend by the increased complexity and for this reason the allegedly greater combat efficiency of the arms purchased in the 1980s. This argument, for which there is undoubtedly

some justification, only partly explains the rise in costs. Some 277 F-15 and 605 F-16 aircraft, the unit costs of which in 1987 prices amounted to \$26.8 million and \$15.1 million per aircraft respectively, were purchased, for example, in the period 1978-1981. In the period 1982-1985 purchases of these aircraft declined to 153 and 534, but the cost of each aircraft had risen to \$42.5 million and \$17.5 million. In this same period there was an increase in the cost of Trident submarines of 24 percent, of the Los Angeles-class attack submarines (SSN-668) of 10 percent and also of a whole number of other programs (11). As a result a considerable amount of the additional appropriations allocated by the Pentagon for the modernization of military hardware was swallowed up by the increased cost thereof.

Even if we examine cases where this increase really went to pay for the increased technical intricacy of weapons systems, even then the picture would seem far from unambiguous. There are assessments indicating that the great technical complexity of certain new types of arms is having a negative effect on their combat readiness. These assessments proceed, for example, from the following data. The new American M-1 tank requires per hour of operation an average of 2 hours 42 minutes' servicing, whereas for its predecessor this indicator constituted only 24 minutes. Maintenance costs are growing accordingly. For the M-1 tank they are approximately 35-40 percent higher than for the M-60 (12).

The increased complexity of the systems being adopted in the United States is compelling another look at the above-mentioned restructuring of the proportions of the military budget which has been carried out by the administration. The widening of the "scissors" between appropriations for purchases of arms on the one hand and their operation and maintenance on the other is leading to the actual combat potential of the American armed forces growing to a lesser extent than might have been expected if solely the dynamics of the "investment" items of the military budget are taken as the basis. Thus the proportion of completely combat ready weapons systems has increased far from always proportionate to the increase in the number of units of military hardware in the arsenal of the U.S. armed forces. This particularly is attracting the attention of American critics of the administration inasmuch as it proclaimed the combat readiness of the armed forces one of its main goals.

As far as the American armed forces' supply of reserves for combat operations, which is considered a most important indicator of combat readiness, is concerned, the actual picture here, despite the increase in appropriations, is far from the point at which this question could be considered solved. Thus the U.S. Air Force is provided with the corresponding backup supplies to the extent of 30 percent, and for the navy this indicator constitutes 22 percent. American specialists estimate that, given the continuation of the rate of growth of appropriations for these needs characteristic of the

period up to 1985, 100-percent provision with reserves may be achieved no earlier than 5-6 years hence, given outlays of the order of \$70 billion (13).

All these problems have been reflected in such a general indicator of combat readiness as the intensity of personnel training programs, where the additional appropriations have in practice led to no pronounced growth (see Table 2).

Table 2. Participation of the U.S. Armed Forces in Military Exercises

Participation of the personnel in exercises (man-years, thousands)	1980	1982	1984
Army	78	76	70
Navy	58	64	64
Marines	19	19	21
Air force	42	44	41
 Flying time per month per aircraft crew, hours			
Army	18.8	17.2	16.4
Navy and marines	24.2	23.7	23.7
Air force	20.2	21.4	21.5
 Number of days at sea per quarter of ships of the navy	86	87	88
 Appropriations for military exercises (\$, billions, 1985)	11.1	12.6	13.8

Source: "Defense Spending: What Has Been Accomplished". Congressional Budget Office, April 1985, p 13.

A most important place upon an analysis of the current state of the American general forces is occupied by a comparison of their actual possibilities with the stated principles of use. The "horizontal escalation" concept proclaimed by the Reagan administration (which has come to be called the "3 and one-half wars" doctrine among American specialists) attracts attention. The demands made on the armed forces by this concept elicited a negative response from the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which declared that the goals of "horizontal escalation" were unattainable even in the event of the successful completion of all plans for the development of the armed forces. As a result the concept proved still-born, and subsequently the development of the American armed forces has come to be based mainly on the waging of two full-scale wars (in Europe and the Near East).

Here also, experts believe, the main problem remains the acute shortage of facilities for the rapid transfer of forces to the areas of combat operations. According to current estimates, conducting them simultaneously in the two said regions would require the delivery there within 30

days of approximately 800,000 tons of military freight, bearing in mind that current possibilities do not exceed 200,000 tons (14). This discrepancy will seemingly continue for quite some time inasmuch as the American leadership has put the emphasis in the solution of this problem on faster, but at the same time more costly and insufficiently efficient (from the viewpoint of carrying capacity) means of air transport, primarily on purchases of the new C-5B transport aircraft (15).

One further particular feature of the programs of the development of the armed forces which have been implemented in the 1980s needs to be noted also. The buildup of military power has not been based on a uniform concerted strategy linking the armed forces' assignments with the means of tackling them. Having jacked up the military budget, the administration has simultaneously accorded the arms of the services practically complete freedom to use the allocated appropriations at their discretion. As a result each corresponding department has been guided by its own priorities in military organizational development based not on common assignments but on "navy, air force, army or marine corps strategy".

But neither on this organizational basis has it been possible to create serious and substantiated concepts. In particular, despite the clamorous publicity campaign, the concept elaborated in the army of an assault on the rear lines enshrined in the doctrine of an air and ground operation was, following detailed discussion, deemed not to be supported by the requisite technical and military-economic resources. This explains why, except for certain individual programs, it has as a concept disintegrated, like a central military program created in support of it—the Assault Breaker reconnaissance-assault complex program. At the same time, however, the potential impact of the concept on the military-political situation in the future, when the corresponding technical possibilities have matured, cannot be discounted.

As far as U.S. naval strategy is concerned, there has been active discussion here in recent years of the Lehman-Watkins concept providing as a principal goal for the delivery of strikes against the territory of the USSR. It is now being sharply criticized in the United States itself. As many authoritative specialists believe, this strategy sharply increases the vulnerability of big and costly ships, which would be forced to operate in the zone of the most concentrated Soviet defenses. However, this concept has in the period of the Reagan administration become a principal argument in support of purchases of costlier and more efficient warships. As a result, as many critics observe, the priorities in naval development chosen by the navy leadership will on the one hand hardly assure performance of assignments in the channel of the Lehman-Watkins concept and, on the other, will actually lead to reduced possibilities of the efficient performance of other important naval functions such as the defense of sea lanes, troop transportation and so forth.

The decentralization of the decision-making process in the Pentagon has had one further consequence also. Under the conditions of the increased independence of the arms of the services the concepts which they have been elaborating have acquired a clearly expressed "purchasing character," that is, have been oriented primarily not toward the creation and preservation of a balanced structure of the armed forces but their rapid saturation with the latest military hardware. Such a practice "worked" under the conditions of the rapid growth of the military budget. But as soon as the growth slowed, all the costs of such an approach made themselves known in the form of inanifest imbalances in the armed forces. A consequence has been the discrepancy between purchases of new equipment and its provision with spares and maintenance facilities. Another example is the situation which has taken shape currently in the navy, where as a result of the emphasis on an increase in the strength of the carrier groups the department's budget has proven insufficient for completely equipping the existing carriers. As a result of the imbalances which have arisen the number of fully combat-ready army subunits has today declined 25 percent compared with 1980, and of the air force, 15 percent, according to one Pentagon report (16).

Summing up the development of the American general armed forces in the 1980s, it may be said that here, as in the strategic sphere also, the Reagan administration has been unable to accomplish the promised surge from "weakness to strength". Despite a certain growth in military potential, it has not been of a fundamental nature and has not matched the increase in the military budget in the 1980s.

The SDI Program

An analysis of the results of the military-political course of the Reagan administration would be incomplete without an evaluation of the "strategic defense initiative" program which it has put forward. Just like the administration's entire military program, the formation of its plans in the sphere of the creation of space-based ABM defenses was accompanied by stepped-up rhetoric, the advancement of knowingly unattainable goals (of the absolutely efficient defenses type) and promises of a "fundamental revolution" in the military sphere. Subsequently, as the SDI program was put into practice, the rhetoric and arrogance and the tasks which were advanced subsided.

Realization of the SDI has come up against the extensive opposition of scientists, politicians and public figures noting both the technical groundlessness of the idea of an efficient ABM system and the bankruptcy of the military-political bases of the program (17). The administration's attempt to enhance the prestige of the program by way of a number of "tests" demonstrating the "successes" in the development of the SDI ended in failure. The analysis of these tests conducted by congressional specialists enabled Sen W. Proxmire to describe them as a series of "deft stunts".

The plan put forward in December 1986 for the "accelerated deployment" of an ABM system based on traditional components (including space-based ABM interceptors), that is, on an outline which has been actively criticized by the supporters of SDI even, may be considered an indirect recognition of the technical and political weakness of the program.

The said weaknesses of the program combined with the tremendous outlays on the development of the system are giving rise to ever increasing congressional opposition. The progressive cutbacks in appropriations for the SDI program testify to this. In the 1985 fiscal year the Defense Department experienced a shortfall of \$300 million (18 percent), in the 1986 fiscal year, \$1 billion (27 percent), and in the 1987 fiscal year, \$1.8 billion (34 percent) in respect of the requested appropriations, and in the 1988 fiscal year, \$1.8 billion (32 percent).

The result of the effect of all these factors has been the pronounced retreat of the U.S. military-political leadership from the goals announced by the President in 1983 in the direction of versions of "limited" ABM defenses as far as target defense, although there has been practically no mention of this in public statements.

At the same time the administration's persistence and its stubborn reluctance to agree to any measures limiting the SDI program are also determined to a considerable extent by the fact that even if the building of an integral efficient ABM system proves impossible, the results of broad-based efforts could be of use in practically all spheres of military development. Such efforts expand the possibilities of the creation of ASAT systems capable of destroying artificial Earth satellites in low, middle and high orbit. The appearance of increasingly small and efficient sensors, computers and their software, work on which is being performed within the SDI framework, could bring closer a qualitative leap forward in conventional arms and the tactics of their operational use and battle management, communications and reconnaissance systems. Work on the SDI program is, besides, strengthening the basis for the creation of third-generation nuclear weapons, which could be seen as a means of inflicting a disarming strike.

Basic Components of Military Policy

If we summarize the material results of the United States' military measures in the 1980s, there arises the natural question of the factors which have prevented the administration realizing its declared aims of military superiority and made for quite low returns from the unprecedented financial investments in the military sphere. The adduced instances of the inefficient expenditure of military appropriations cannot fully explain this situation, which, it would seem, has been a consequence of two most important factors—economic and S&T—determining the objective limits of a rapid increase in military power.

Life has confirmed that the stability of the nuclear balance possesses a substantial dynamic range. This has rendered hopeless all attempts to achieve military superiority on the traditional paths of the nuclear arms race. While proclaiming reliance on a spurt ahead toward military superiority, the administration has in practice lacked both the actual possibilities for achieving it and the S&T prerequisites making it possible to extricate from the state of overall approximate equilibrium the entire structure of the military balance, which is complex and which possesses great force of inertia.

The administration has found itself confined to a strict (albeit in this period significantly expanded) budget framework, which has prevented it creating and realizing the necessary material-technical conditions. The policy of increased military spending and simultaneously tax cuts brought about the rapid growth of the federal budget deficit and ultimately led to more assertive congressional intervention in budget policy.

Although the Reagan leadership had certain opportunities for achieving one-sided advantages in respect of individual components of the military balance, this would have required the articulation of the spheres of military organizational development most advantageous to the United States with the corresponding concentration of resources on a limited number of assignments. The administration did not agree to such an adjustment: the political-ideological aspects which ensued from the fact of the budget increase remained for it, evidently, no less (if not more) important than the actual results of the declared measures. This approach has undoubtedly borne fruit. The perception of American strength has changed appreciably both within the country and overseas in the past 7 years. The perception of weakness which was manifestly present in the sentiments of the American public in the 1970s has receded into the past.

If the material and political-psychological results of the Reagan administration's activity are ranked together, the obvious preponderance of the latter is evidently no accident. Clearly expressed elements if not of outright bluff, in any event, of the calculation of a psychological offensive along a broad front may be discerned in the ideas proclaimed by Reagan.

The following main instruments of the present administration's military-political course may be distinguished from this viewpoint:

the artificial spurring in the country of an atmosphere of "special circumstances" contributing to the consolidation of the nation around a "decisive and dynamic" leadership. The very tone of the criticism leveled at preceding administrations, the manifestly unobjective assessments of the military balance, the campaign surrounding the "window of vulnerability" and the growing "Soviet threat" in this connection and so forth worked to accomplish this task. All these means of pressure on the mentality of the ordinary American performed their

function at a certain stage, and their continued use became unprofitable to the administration. As if at the waving of a magic wand, the interpretation of the balance of forces changed abruptly, and official estimates of the "Soviet threat" were toned down appreciably. Unconnected with the actual state of affairs, which, as the above analysis shows, had not changed in principle since the end of the 1970s, such a change of official phraseology was designed to highlight the administration's "services" in having "appreciably rectified the situation";

the emphatically militant statements concerning the possibility of victory in a nuclear war, official proclamation of the concept of military superiority—all this was designed to demonstrate a decisive style of leadership and its confidence in its powers. But here also the administration has been forced in recent years to switch to a more restrained and even peaceable rhetoric inasmuch as the hard-line wording, regardless of whether it had performed its psychological functions, had begun to operate counter to the leadership's interests, having given rise to a mass antinuclear and peace movements and growing concern at U.S. policy among the allies. A return was also required at a particular moment from reliance on unilateral actions and negotiations exclusively "from a position of strength" to a more moderate line of behavior, which was to have demonstrated the essential "rectification" of the military-political situation allegedly as a result of the decisive measures adopted by the leadership. In addition, the very policy of the administration was being pushed by the country's influential moderate forces toward a reconsideration of the situation, stimulating a growth of interest in the idea of arms limitation. Under these conditions negotiating with the USSR was not only a forced but also necessary measure. However, this did not prevent the use of all concessions and compromises on the part of the negotiating partner (natural for the diplomatic process) for the purpose of propagandizing the soundness of its power policy;

the sharp expansion of investments in the military sphere as support for political declarations. Given this approach, decisive significance is attached to the mere fact of the accelerated growth of the military budget, whereas in the short term its actual allocation and the efficient use of the allocated appropriations are of secondary significance. The artificially jacked-up military budget has been only partly supported by actual programs for the development of the armed forces, to which, in particular, the rapid growth of appropriations which have been unspent and unsupported by commissions and which have accumulated in the 1980s in Pentagon accounts testifies. Under the conditions of the absence of both the logistical prerequisites and radical conceptual principles permitting the achievement of the declared goals, the emphasis on the military budget was for the leadership a forced measure, and the budget itself has secured not so much a real increase in military power as the political and psychological perception of such growth.

A no less important consideration behind the increase in military appropriations may be considered the endeavor to pull the USSR into an arms race beyond its means, primarily in areas of the development of the latest technology. Here the administration saw possibilities of returns from investments in the military sphere connected, first, with the U.S. lead in certain key technical fields and, second, with the certain imperfection of the mechanism for assimilating the latest technology in the USSR. It was contemplated reorienting rivalry toward these areas and imposing on the Soviet Union its own conditions of the arms race. Whence such programs as, for example, "smart weapons" and the SDI, which widen sharply the spectrum of the sectors of industry involved in the sphere of the arms race. According to calculations of the U.S. Administration, the USSR's embarkation upon the path of a "technology race" (and specialists working for the administration saw for the former no other choice, considering past experience and the fact that new technology promises fundamentally new military possibilities) would push it toward inevitable bankruptcy. That such calculations occupied a pronounced place in Washington's plans is indicated by the attention which it is paying to measures to restrict exports to the USSR of all latest technology. In addition, the gamble on "exotic" technology has also performed important psychological functions. Specifically, it has been observed (J. Foster, former director of the Defense Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency, for example, wrote about this) that "exotic weapons" have a far stronger impact on the mind than the actual weapons which are already in existence and that the idea of the creation of some laser gun or neutron, acoustic and radiological weapons (particularly if what is being discussed is utterly incomprehensible) operates considerably more powerfully on the person who is far removed from technology (the leader of a state included) than any projects for the enhanced combat efficiency of weapons systems, even those which are exceptionally devastating, which are already in service.

And, finally, one further important instrument of the administration's military-political course has been the cautious and measured use of military power where undesirable consequences for the United States have been precluded and at the same time an opportunity to demonstrate the resolve to defend U.S. "national interests" by all accessible means has appeared. Such examples were the invasion of Grenada, the bombing of Libya and numerous showings of the American flag, that is, situations in which the leadership had every reason to expect quick success and did not fear negative repercussions in the form of an escalation of the conflict and the involvement therein of significant American forces. At the same time, despite the militant rhetoric, the Reagan administration has not dared to openly invade Nicaragua, all the costs of which it has not been able to confidently predict. Washington also hastened to remove the marines from Beirut following an incident there. A paradoxical situation wherein it is frequently

the State Department which advocates the use of American armed forces overseas and where the Pentagon is opposed to this has taken shape.

Summing up, it may be said that whereas at the initial stage in the policy of the Reagan administration there were hopes of the possibility of a rapid spurt toward military superiority, subsequently, as the groundlessness of such hopes became increasingly apparent, the center of gravity began to shift gradually toward exploitation of the political and psychological effect of the policy being pursued. This shift was natural inasmuch as this remained practically the sole sphere in which the administration could expect to acquire domestic and foreign policy dividends.

The administration seemingly understood that the function of nuclear weapons (and in the case of the Soviet-American confrontation, weapons in general) is to intimidate and not to be fired. Whence the endeavor to restore the perception of superiority even without a particular examination of what this means in practice. Whence a new phenomenon—the emphasizing of the "weakness" of the USSR. Whereas the administration assumed office with repeated statements concerning the "buildup of Soviet power," an opposite note has been heard increasingly often recently. Use is being made here also of the positive trends in the development of Soviet society initiated by the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum and the 27th party congress. Distorting the essence thereof, the administration is attempting to place the reason for the "weakness of the Soviets" primarily in the economic and S&T spheres.

The opinion prevalent in the West that the perception of "American strength" has been reflected in the policy of the Soviet leadership also operates in the same direction as well. The "USSR's inclination to compromise" on a number of key problems of arms limitation which has appeared recently and its clearly expressed concern at the work on the SDI program and the painful response to leaks concerning "Pentagon directives" are also seen as confirmation of this. Active use is being made of such arguments in corroboration of the soundness of the policy being pursued by the Republican administration and determine to a large extent the likelihood of its continuity.

At the same time, however, the effect in the West and in the United States caused by the Soviet leadership's statements concerning an asymmetrical response to the SDI, which has become a most telling argument in the hands of its opponents, calls attention to itself. The impact of the Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions, particularly its repeated extension, despite the Americans' continuation of nuclear testing, also proved significant and largely unexpected for the administration. The principle of reasonable sufficiency, which has been put forward as the basis of the USSR's military policy, is gaining momentum also.

The USSR's new approaches to the problem of military rivalry with the United States are taking the ground away from the hopes of certain U.S. circles for the economic exhaustion of our country. This gamble emanated largely from the predictability of the Soviet side's potential retaliatory measures and was built on the fact that it would continue "to play by the American rules". A clearly expressed emphasis on the response of the other side may be detected in the works of many military theorists, specifically in a work by H. Brown written following his resignation as defense secretary. Specifically, he believes, the fact that the Soviet Union has spent more resources on the creation of a system of ABM defenses against American strategic aviation fully compensates all U.S. expenditure on its offensive weapons (16).

It has to be said that this idea was expanded and its emphasis changed somewhat under Reagan. For the success of the technology race imposed by the United States the USSR's more symmetrical retaliatory actions were essential for the administration. This can be seen from an analysis of the main directions in which the administration threw down a challenge to it. Having obtained a symmetrical response, the administration would consider its steps justified, despite their great cost.

The refusal to follow the paths imposed by the United States which has been declared by the Soviet leadership and its active and consistent pursuit of a policy based on the principles of equal and general security are undermining the very foundations of the United States' military-political course and showing the ineffectiveness of political and psychological pressure on the Soviet Union and the futility of attempts to drag it into a ruinous arms race.

Footnotes

1. "Report of Secretary of Defense H. Brown to the Congress on the FY 1982, Budget, FY 1983 Authorization Request and FY 1982-1986 Defense Programs. January 19, 1981," Washington, 1981, p 16.

2. See "Report of Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1983 Budget, FY 1984 Authorization Request and FY 1983-1987 Defense Programs. February 8, 1982," Washington, 1982, pp 1-31.

3. A. Maroni, R. Foelber, "The Defense Spending Debate: Comparing Recent Defense Appropriation with 1981 Projections," Congressional Research Service, May 29, 1984, p 13.

4. "Department of Defense. National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 1986," Washington, 1985, pp 120, 121.

5. "American Defense Annual 1987-1988". Edited by J. Kruzel, Lexington, p 52.

6. See "U.S. Strategic Doctrine. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Senate, December 14, 1982," Washington, 1983, p 100.

7. See "American Defense Annual 1987-1988," p 59.

8. Estimated from "Defense Spending: What Has Been Accomplished". Congressional Budget Office, April 1985, p 13.

9. R. Stubbing, "The Defense Game," New York, 1986, p 48.

10. W. Kaufman, "A Reasonable Defense," Washington, the Brookings Institution, 1986, p 43.

11. R. Stubbing, Op. cit., p 47.

12. THE DEFENSE MONITOR. Center for Defense Information, vol XIII, No 4, Washington, p 5.

13. "Defense Spending..." p 22.

14. W. Kaufman, "The Defense Budget: Setting National Priorities. The 1984 Budget," Washington, Brookings Institution, 1983, p 66.

15. Fifty C-5B aircraft are capable in 30 days of delivering approximately 300,000 tons of military freight. Fourteen such aircraft had been received into service as of 1987.

16. THE DEFENSE MONITOR, p 4.

17. A most substantial work devoted to the problem of the technical feasibility of the SDI was a report released at the start of 1987 of the American Physics Society, which analyzed the possibilities of directed-energy weapons. The report's main conclusion was that it would take at least 10-15 years of persistent efforts just to ascertain the possibility in principle of the creation of a system of the destruction of ballistic missiles on this basis.

18. See H. Brown, "Thinking About National Security. Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World," Boulder (Col.), 1983, p 63.

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Editorial on Common European Home, 'Second Reykjavik'
18070161a Moscow Z4 RUBEZHOM in Russian
No 29, 15-21 Jul 88 p 1

[Editorial: "For the Sake of Europe in the Future"]

[Text] "A common European home..." This concept, originating from a new political thinking, lies today at the center of discussions taking place in both East and West. Is it at all possible to bring the continent's inhabitants under one roof if they have not yet eliminated distrust of one another and have such diverse ideas as to the political and economic construction of society? Some political figures would answer this question in the negative. They prefer bunkers bristling with machine guns as a common home. But such an outlook is not attractive to many. There has been more and more discussion, therefore, not as to whether or not a "common European home" is necessary, but rather as to how to build it. During his friendly, official visit to the People's Republic of Poland, CC CPSU General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev called for working drafts to be drawn up, followed by erection of a building of the new Europe.

A Time of Changes

All of Europe has now entered a period of changes. In the West 12 member nations of the European community have decided to finalize creation of a "unified market" by 1992, i.e., to remove all barriers along the path of moving goods, capital and manpower. This is a contrary and complex process having diverse social consequences. Member nations of the community will hardly be able to achieve full economic integration within the prescribed time frame. But few doubt that it will come to pass in the end.

Still more radical changes are taking place in the East. The socialist countries are busy searching for new, more effective means of development. This of course takes place in the various countries in various ways. The forms and nature of transformations and the rate at which they occur depend on the specific conditions in one country or another, on what circumstances have been inherited from the past, and on subjective factors as well. But we may speak in general terms about the renewal of socialism, its humanization, and its liberation from distortions and deformations which have occurred over the decades.

Along with internal restructuring in the socialist countries, a restructuring of relations between them is also taking place. There has developed a significant renewal in recent times of the foundations upon which cooperation in the socialist world is built. Sound principles were of course proclaimed earlier, but, unfortunately, they were often just proclamations. Today, as M. S. Gorbachev stated in Warsaw, equality, independence and joint resolution of common problems is becoming the immutable standard of our relations. They are losing their

elements of paternalism and are coming to be based thoroughly and completely on voluntary common interests of partnership and comradeship.

The socialist countries are now faced with the necessity of making a technological jump, rising to a new level of scientific and technical progress. This question has important political significance as well, insofar as the manner in which it is resolved will lead to judgments on the capabilities of socialism. It will be easier, of course, to deal with this common task if a joint, combined effort on the part of our countries is applied.

At the recently convened 44th session of the Council of Mutual Economic Aid in Prague, results of cooperation during the period 1986-1987 were discussed in business-like and self-critical fashion. Noting the successes which were achieved, the session reached the conclusion at the same time that resolution of the socio-economic problems facing CMEA member nations will require greater use of the potential capabilities of economic cooperation and a new, more effective approach to deepening the division of labor. Responding to these requirements, the session adopted a collective concept of international socialist division of labor for 1991-2005. CMEA member nations (with the exception of Rumania) also confirmed an agreement reached earlier on the gradual establishment of conditions for free movement among them of goods, services and other production commodities, with the goal of forming a joint market in the future.

The question may arise—if CMEA creates a socialist common market and the European Community a unified market of 12 capitalist countries, will not such a development lead to a deeper split of the continent? Is this compatible with the concept of a "common European home"? Economic integration in Western and Eastern Europe is a natural process brought about by objective factors. But this does not in any way mean that the two common markets will exist in isolation, not touching one another. On the contrary, these large-scale economic organizations can and must cooperate and in so doing facilitate construction of the "common European home." The first step has already been taken—a joint declaration has been signed on the establishment of official relations between CMEA and the EEC. But this is only the first step. Opportunities for cooperation are indeed unlimited.

A Second "Reykjavik" is Necessary

If co-operation between two economic organizations can be advantageous to the inhabitants of our continent, then the existence of military blocs can in no way blend in with the "common European home" concept. What kind of common home is it whose residents amass various kinds of armament in their apartments, fearing invasion from their neighbors?

It would hardly be realistic to suppose that the military blocs could be eliminated—today or tomorrow. The distrust in relations between East and West is already too great. Without a doubt, clearing away the obstacles of the past will take time. But we must not lose it by postponing resolution of the most urgent problems. The most important thing today is that we continue the disarmament process begun by the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate and Shorter-Range Missiles, insure its continuity and extend it to apply to all types of armament.

The West often sets apart the problem of conventional arms and conventional forces in Europe, pointing to the "overwhelming," as it were, superiority of the Warsaw Pact in this regard. The figures they cite here can, of course, be contested. But experience shows this would be useless.

The Soviet proposals M. S. Gorbachev brought up in Warsaw allow us to avoid any kind of dispute over the figures. A reduction is proposed to be carried out in three stages. The first entails identification and elimination of all unbalances and asymmetry between NATO and the Warsaw Pact with regard to both numbers of troops and weapons. The second calls for reductions in NATO and Warsaw Pact troop strengths of 500,000 on each side—this after achieving the levels proposed in the first stage. The third and final stage provides for continued reductions in such a way as to impart an exclusively defensive nature, once and for all, to the military formations of both alliances.

Such an approach takes into account the interests of both sides. We have heard no serious objections of any kind. But the proposal has not received any support within NATO circles. What is the matter here?

Apparently the problem lies in the way the NATO governments traditionally look at conventional weapons—as a legitimate component of power politics—as they continue to build up their reserves. Society has still not fully thought through the misfortunes such a policy is fraught with.

In order to get things going M. S. Gorbachev proposed that an all-European "Reykjavik" be conducted, a meeting of all the European countries, to discuss one issue: how can we shift from words to actions in the sphere of reducing conventional armaments? Let us recall that the Soviet-American meeting in Iceland's capital effected a breakthrough in nuclear disarmament which comprised the groundwork for laying the path to the INF Treaty.

Two specific proposals were laid out in Warsaw which drew widespread interest: the removal of Soviet comparable air assets from their forward bases in Eastern Europe if NATO agrees not to deploy in Italy its 72 F-16 fighter-bombers Spain refused to base; the establishment of a European center for reducing military danger, a place where NATO and the Warsaw Pact might cooperate.

If a second "Reykjavik" is created and the hopes entrusted in it prove justified, a sound foundation will have been constructed for the common European building, providing stability for the structure as a whole.

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Central Europe: A Zone of Confidence, Security
*18070161b Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian
No 29, 15-21 Jul 88 p 2*

[Editorial: "Central Europe: A Zone of Confidence, Security"; first paragraph is ZA RUBEZHOM introduction]

[Text] Delivering his speech in the Sejm of the Polish People's Republic, M. S. Gorbachev declared support for the recent proposal of a joint working committee of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany to nation-state participants in the Helsinki process for the creation of a zone of confidence and security in Central Europe. His speech emphasized that only a lessening of the military confrontation would make feasible the development of a European system of joint security and all-encompassing cooperation. To this end it is particularly necessary to work out as quickly as possible a mandate in Vienna for conducting negotiations before the year's end on reductions in the armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe, and on eliminating all tactical nuclear weapons on the continent. He also proposed specific measures establishing greater confidence and strengthening security. We publish herewith the third installment of his presentation which deals with these matters.

We make the following proposals before the governments of the nation-state participants to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on creating a zone of confidence and security in central Europe and we recommend that the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic introduce appropriate initiatives.

In order to create such a zone of confidence and security, measures are necessary which would convince both sides that, in spite of the available potential, there is no intent to inflict a sudden attack.

The following conditions are necessary:

a) Expansion of what was achieved at the Stockholm agreement:

—by further decreasing the lower limits in numbers of soldiers and tanks employed during exercises required to be announced at least 60 days in advance;

- by including here matters concerning the announcement of independent air force and naval exercises, with information as to scope and regionalization—heretofore discussed in Stockholm without result—so as to further strengthen trust;
- by announcing exercises in which over 20,000 troops participate two years prior to their conduct;
- by not conducting exercises from this time forward in which more than 40,000 troops take part—this relates to series of exercises and the development of alert operations;
- by inviting observers to all announced exercises.

b) Additionally:

- the number of exercises conducted outside military training areas, which create problems for the civilian population, should be limited;
- maneuvers requiring mandatory announcement in the spirit of this proposal should not be conducted in the 50-kilometer zone, for example, up to both sides of the border between the alliances.

These confidence-building measures represent proposals which can be discussed and coordinated with all concerned nations.

c) The central European nations will establish permanent "confidence-strengthening centers" tasked with the following: the exchange of militarily significant information and observations, in order to enable participating nations to avoid the development of crisis situations in central Europe or settle their disputes using political means. All centers would be outfitted with the same technical equipment and would establish direct communications with one another. Their personnel must include representatives and experts from all participating nations.

d) Military experts of the nations concerned must be authorized to coordinate operational details for permanent combined observation posts at strategically significant points. Results of such observations must be conveyed to the "confidence-strengthening centers."

All concerned nations must exchange military attaches.

e) The proposal is made for joint European satellite-based observation, the results of which are to be transmitted immediately to all "confidence-strengthening centers." This could also become the common instrument of nation-state participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Results of these observations would be made available to all the European nations, the United States and Canada.

f) Direct bilateral communications links ("hot lines") should also be established between central European nations. In the event apprehension arises or incidents take place, these would provide swift attainment of understanding between governments.

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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Genscher-Shevardnadze Breakthrough in Arms Talks

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28 Sep 88

[Excerpt] New York (DPA)—The over 3 hour-long meeting between the Federal Republic's Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and his Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York has made progress in the Berlin Clause and a spectacular breakthrough in conventional disarmament. Diplomatic sources in the FRG delegation announced today that the two politicians had pushed the most difficult stumbling block for negotiations on conventional stability to one side.

In Bonn, the Free Democrats assessed the results of the talk as a "breakthrough for Berlin." Now that years of negotiations had finally found a happy ending, the way will now be clear for a successful visit by the Federal chancellor to Moscow. Horst Ehmke, deputy chairman of the SPD parliamentary group was sceptical in contrast, and spoke of fine-sounding declarations of intentions. Doubts will remain until they have been refuted by facts.

The agreement, which was not in sight in Shevardnadze's preceding talks in Washington, and which also surprised the Americans, concerns the definition of weapons systems of dual application. Here, for example, certain types of artillery are meant, which can fire nuclear and conventional warheads. On Tuesday, Shevardnadze accepted an earlier Western formula, according to which in Vienna

1. Negotiations will be only on conventional armaments,
2. Dual systems can (repeat can) be included in the negotiations and
3. The question as to which these systems are will not be clarified until the negotiations themselves.

At the beginning of the talks Shevardnadze had been supporting the previous Soviet negative position.

The significance lies in the assessment of fighter aircraft. According to the West, these are conventional weapons and have to be an object of negotiations in Vienna. The Soviets wanted to keep them out of these negotiations. The Soviets

wanted to exclude them from these negotiations on the basis that they are supposed dual-purpose weapons, and therefore avoid a reduction in the number of these aircraft.

The result of the talks means the removal of a stumbling block, which Genscher was still describing during his visit to Moscow in July as "the question of questions." Problems, described by diplomatic sources as surmountable, still remain unresolved.

Scholz Calls for Soviet Troop Reductions

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[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Defense Minister Rupert Scholz (CDU) has called on the Soviet Union to reduce its troop contingents in the Warsaw Pact states. Addressing the "Security and Disarmament" discussion group of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, which is close to the SPD, Scholz said on Thursday evening that a reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Eastern bloc states "would strengthen our confidence and contribute to the improvement of relations." The Soviet Union could, without any risk to its own security, begin with this today and it would create considerable confidence in the seriousness of its foreign policy.

There are indications for Scholz "which let us hope that the power policy hitherto practiced is being seen more critically in the Soviet Union itself." However, Scholz noted that under General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev so far, arms expenditures have risen markedly year by year. The Soviet military potential has far exceeded the extent necessary for defense. It is now up to the Soviet Union itself to send clear signals of a turning away from its current policy of hegemony. The West seeks to achieve conditions of "increased mutual security."

Scholz regrets that the basic consensus on security policy in the Federal Republic has become "somewhat worn down." "We have to consolidate it once again." He is worried that the recognition of the need for defense preparedness is decreasing continually among Federal citizens. In public debate, the term—security—is being used but rarely, and the terms—disarmament and arms control—all the more "as if this alone could increase the measure of understanding." Increasingly, the fundamental conditions of national existence are being measured on wishful thinking, when sober reality is the watchword. The minister emphasized that it is the task of all social areas of the Federal Republic "to support the task of the state to guarantee security."

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